# Conflict Studies Research Centre

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# EU Civilian Crisis Management

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# Introduction

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The EU's proposed Rapid Reaction Corps has received widespread media attention (with the 'European Army') and academic assessment since it was first proposed in the late 1990s. By contrast, the development and significance of the EU's civilian crisis management policy has barely received coverage by analysts or the media, at least until the start of the Swedish EU presidency. As a consequence, the concept of civilian crisis management or non-military crisis management is under-thematized and deserving of further study. It is within this context that three project partners - Tampere Peace Research Institute, University of Tampere, the Scottish Centre for International Security, University of Aberdeen and the Peace Union of Finland - organized an international seminar entitled **Non-Military Crisis Management** in Helsinki, 20-21 April 2001. The seminar focussed on the concept and its practical impact on European integration. It has generated a collection of papers that highlight key practical and conceptual aspects of EU non-military crisis management policy formation. They outline some of the obstacles, challenges and potential solutions that are set to shape the effectiveness of this new policy instrument.

At St Malo in December 1998 the notion of an autonomous EU capacity in crisis management was introduced, and the non-military crisis response tools were articulated at the Cologne June 1999 EU Summit. The Presidency Report of the EU Helsinki Council in December 1999 further institutionalised the process by stressing the need to co-ordinate the civilian crisis management capability. This capability was defined at the Feira European Council of June 2000 to include legislative, executive and judicial aspects through the deployment of civilian police, humanitarian assistance, administrative and legal rehabilitation, search and rescue, electoral and human rights monitoring. In Lisbon 2000 the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management was created, along with a database of EU civilian police capabilities, a 'crisis cell', and concrete targets for 2003 for the EU in civilian crisis management.[1] In May 2001 the EU Police Capacity Conference addressed EU member states' preparedness for the mobilization of 5,000 police by 2003, 1,000 deployable at a month's notice on crisis operations.[2] In Gothenburg in June 2001 the EU Swedish Presidency will conclude with the agreement on concrete targets to strengthen the rule of law, consolidate civilian administration and civil protection.[3]

What type of threat or crisis requires external civilian crisis intervention? Liisa Laakso has argued that 'complex political crises' will trigger an EU crisis management response.[4] These crises concern the survival of a political unit or entity and are likely to involve intra-state violence that in turn exacerbates negative and destabilising spill-over effects for EU states. Such spill-over effects would

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threaten the values and interests of the EU and might include the uncontrolled influx of asylum seekers, illegal trans-border trade, economic, environmental and ideological threats. The EU is prepared to use its 'rich toolbox' of 'civilian instruments' in order to prevent conflict, manage crises and in post-conflict action in non-EU European NATO countries, accession candidate countries, third countries and other potential partners.

The deployment of EU crisis management civilian instruments into its 'near neighbourhood' entails intervention in the poorly integrated, impoverished and fragile Black Sea littoral state-building projects. Economic 'black-holes', 'frozen conflicts', and seriously destabilised weak and collapsed regions and de facto political entities exist in Moldova (Transnistria/Dnestr and Gagauz Yeri), Georgia (South Osetia, Abkhazia, Ajaria), Azerbaijain (Nagorno-Karabakh) and Armenia (Nakhichevan). Between 1988 and 1994, for example, 20,000 people died and 1.2 million were displaced as a consequence of the fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Emergent states in the South Balkan region, particularly Albania, Bosnia and Macedonia and quasi or proto-states such as Montenegro and Kosovo, can also be considered all potential candidates for future EU civilian crisis management capability. One might be tempted to add to this list Chechnya, Dagestan, North Osetia, Karbadino-Balkaria and the other republics of the 'Southern Federal District' in Russia's unstable North Caucasus region.

These various regions, protectorates and states can be characterised as pathological political entities for a number of reasons:

♦ Firstly, transnational factors are as important as national/regional in determining their relative stability. The primary reason for this is the inter-linkage between economic and political sources of insecurity and the ability of elites within these entities to resort to violence as a means to secure their ends.
♦ Secondly, they have a demonstrably destabilizing and 'contagious' impact on neighbouring states.
♦ Thirdly, although they are largely unrecognised and functional security appears to be lacking, they are very real political entities directed by 'messy networks' of actors and interests.
♦ Fourthly, they sustain pathological institutions – that is, institutions whose institutional ethos undermines their institutional purpose.
♦ Fifthly, the personalization and perpetuation of power within enclosed elites through the institutionalisation of instability appears to be the defining security leitmotif.

Their pathological status renders civilian crisis management operations both pressing and necessary but their implementation highly problematic. It is clear, for example, that as the KLA have failed to gain the independence of Kosovo through the electoral process, they aim to fight KFOR troops within the province and spread the fighting into Macedonia. Similarly, if KFOR attempts to combat organized crime and undermine the criminal clan networks within the region - prime funders of KLA activity - then the KLA will engage KFOR. Vladimir Putin in his interview with Gehardt Shroeder noted:

> *You know, in my view, there is a very great danger because Europe is effectively gaining its own little Afghanistan or Chechnya but not in its remote reaches but right at its heart. You know, the danger isn't just of*

*drugs getting through although nowadays about 60-70% of drugs in Western Europe do come in through Kosovo. Nor is it a case of illegal businesses, the arms trade or prostitution. In my view, and I'm saying this publicly for the first time, the main danger for Europe lies in the fact that, given the transparency of its borders, it is virtually impossible to protect them, because of the mountains. The criminal redistribution of the European economy could start from that territory. It would be out of everyone's control and the first victim could be Europe's small and medium-sized businesses. What do Europeans usually do? If they encounter something illegal, where do they go? To court. But terrorists have only one answer: a shot in the head. And then they vanish into uncontrolled territory and it would be very hard for Europe to fight this. I don't think Europe's ready for it.*[5]

Taking another example, the Chairman of the Duma Committee for relations with the CIS, Boris Pastukhov, bitterly criticised Tiraspol's uncompromising stance in its dialogue with Chisinau: 'There were people in that region [Dnestr] who bank on war and preservation of the current state of conflict.' He noted that each day the status quo is maintained brings political gains and money to politicians who delay the negotiation process: 'They are kings in this kingdom, where neither law nor good breeding exists.' [6]

Thus, if we consider the potential second and third echelon EU candidate states that stretch across an extended Black Sea arena, sub-regions that are demonstrably 'in crisis' are clear candidates for EU Crisis Management intervention, also lack necessary preconditions for effective intervention. As a result, EU civilian Crisis Management policies will be extremely difficult to enact effectively within the pathological regions that litter the space into which EU enlargement is set to integrate over the next two decades.

Two other general points can be made. Firstly, as crisis management concerns both military and non-military aspects, it appears foolish to consider these as separate capabilities. Rather it is more realistic to combine them. The emphasis will be 'from military to non-military' crisis management instruments in the development of any conflict prevention and resolution strategy. This will leave the purely civilian instruments for the internal stabilization of the EU itself. Secondly, it is currently unclear how the intervention of the EU's Crisis Management instruments into non-EU states can be legitimised. For this reason it is very important that one of the key issues in Crisis Management development at the EU Gothenburg Summit will be the relationship between EU–UN co-operation in the conflict prevention and crisis management area. At present the UN is responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security and only the UN can claim to speak for the international community.

Having identified some potential 'credibility traps' for the EU's nascent crisis management capability, and touched on some of the key debates and issues that must be discussed and resolved between the end of the Swedish EU presidency in June 2001 and deployment of the capability in 2003, let us now turn to the individual contributions.

**Erkki Tuomioja**, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Finland, provides a brief overview of the evolution of the concept of civilian crisis management as one of the EU's foreign and security instruments. He argues that the successful deployment of this non-military capability will contribute towards positive identity construction in the EU

and strengthen its international political position. He charts the progress achieved during the Swedish Presidency of the EU (January–June 2001), in particular the establishment of key priorities for the continued development of this instrument.

**Jaakko Blomberg,** Under Secretary of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Finland, identifies the nature of crises which may trigger EU civilian intervention and discusses three distinctive periods in which different types of intervention might be appropriate: the conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict action phases.

**Sverre Stub**, Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway assess European crisis management from a Norwegian perspective. He stresses the interdependence between military and non-military crisis management and notes that the nature of the proposed interface between the military and non-military instruments has still to be determined. He argues that current peace operations can be divided into three categories - military, civilian security, civilian - which he then discusses.

**Johan Eriksson**, Lecturer, Department of Political Science, Södertörns högskola (University College), Sweden, and his colleagues analyse the relationship between academic and practitioner contributions to the formation of Crisis Management policy. He argues that researchers must ensure they are working *with* rather than *for* practitioners and that research is best communicated through teaching and training. These are the only situations in which the scholar rather than the practitioner is in control, and in which the culture of academe rather than politics dominates.

**Kaja Tael,** Director General, Policy Planning Department of the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, assesses the extent to which Estonian perspectives on crisis management coincide with those of Finland and Sweden. After noting that Finnish and Swedish support for civilian crisis management has usefully highlighted weaknesses in existing capacities, she then identifies Estonia's experience of crisis management.

**Pinar Bilgin,** Lecturer, Department of International Relations, Bilkent University, Ankara, discusses Turkey's role in the evolving European security architecture with special reference to the debates on the recent EU move to develop military capabilities for crisis management purposes. She presents a brief overview of the roles Turkey has played as a part of European security order during the Cold War and then post-Cold War developments in Turkey-EU relations. She argues that the interest both Turkey and the EU have shown in the development of a European military capability for crisis management purposes constitute yesterday's answers to tomorrow's problems - which are likely to be radically different from those of the past.

**Stanislav Tkachenko** offers a particularly Russian perspective on EU Crisis Management. He asks two questions: what are the crises that the EU currently faces? What are the crises that are likely to develop - particularly those on the EU's doorstep? He provides a salutary lesson that the evolving EU Crisis Management capability is inextricably intertwined with its use and with the EU's relations with its neighbours.

**Hanna Ojanen**, Senior Research Fellow, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki, argues that the speed at which the EU has invested time, expertise and finance to develop civilian crisis management capability presents potential

difficulties. Could it be, she asks, that by 2003 the EU is in need of a crisis – not too challenging, but neither so insignificant to render intervention irrelevant – more than the victims of the crisis require EU intervention? Does the EU's civilian crisis management capability represent policy-making by default, a policy initiative as a substitute alternative to developing an EU constitution or reforming the Common Agricultural Policy? She concludes by discussing the impact of the policy on EU member states' non-alignment strategies and non-EU states that wish to integrate.

## Endnotes

[1]     A useful compilation of these documents can be read in Maartje Rutten, 'From St Malo to Nice - European defence: core documents', *Chaillot Papers*, No 47, (Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, Paris, May 2001), p225.

[2]     For a good introduction to web-pages concerning European Crisis Management and other security related matters, we recommend the all-inclusive EU link portal called 'European Security & Defence Policy Links', http://europa.eu.int/comm/nice_council/esdplinks_en.htm

[3]     The 'Swedish Presidency' pages, including details of the 'Gothenburg Meeting', can be found at: http://eu2001.se/eu2001/main/   General conclusions: The Presidency Conclusions, Gothenburg European Council, 15-16 June 2001, can be read at: http://eu2001.se/static/pdf/eusummit/conclusions_eng.pdf   EU-UN cooperation in conflict prevention and crisis management - Conclusions General Affairs Council, 11 June 2001 - can be rad at: http://eu2001.se/eu2001/news/news_read.asp?iInformationID=15873   NB: 'Particular regional issues, Western Balkans, Middle East and Africa, in particular for Great Lakes, Horn of Africa and West Africa, will be for the time being the priority areas of reinforced cooperation between the EU and the UN.'

[4]     Liisa Laakso, 'Civilian Crisis Management and State Sovereignty: Insights into the Emerging Policy of the European Union', *Paper Presented at the International Studies Association 42nd Annual Convention, 20-24 February 2001, Chicago*. See also: Heinz Gartner, 'European Security, the Transatlantic Link and Crisis Management', 125-148, in Heinz Gartner, Adrian Hyde-Price and Erich Reiter (eds), *Europe's New Security Challenges* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 2001); Karen Von Hippel, 'Complexities and Uncertainties, Protracted Conflicts and International Security', 13-173, in Michael Clarke (ed), *Brassey's Defence YearBook 1999*, (Brassey's, London and Washington 1999).

[5]     *Russian Public TV* (ORT), Moscow, 7 April 2000.

[6]     *Basapress news agency*, Chisinau, 22 March 2000.

# Non-Military Crisis Management as a Part of Foreign & Security Policy

## Erkki Tuomioja
*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland*

This Seminar on Non-Military Crisis Management comes at a very timely juncture. First, the next European Council will convene in Gothenburg in two months' time, and the preparations for the Presidency Report are well under way. The military aspects of EU crisis management are proceeding fast and the civilian side has to keep up with the pace.

Second, the challenges of non-military crisis management will remain on the international agenda for a longer time than some of us might have initially thought. My recent visit to Kosovo convinced me that this is not a passing issue. The international community has a huge amount of work ahead before it can argue that it has done everything in its power to help establish an effective civil society in a failed state.

Third and last, this discussion is also timely because the Finnish Government is currently preparing a new Government Report to Parliament on Security and Defence Policy where civilian crisis management will be dealt with for the first time. It is, therefore, the right time to establish closer ties between scholars and those in charge of practical implementation, that is, between those who observe, analyse and criticize and those who formulate the political will, implement it and try to learn from past lessons and mistakes.

Crises of the 1990s, in particular in the Balkans, brought about a new type of internal and complex crisis in which the international community had to cope with failed states. Traditional forms of peacekeeping as such did not provide adequate tools for handling the new challenges. Military presence could help to create a secure environment, but the military could not build a society, with its infrastructure, basic services and administration. Therefore, coordinated civilian action had to be introduced as a way to alleviate human emergencies and stabilize the situation in crisis areas. This kind of civilian assistance from outside a crisis area is now referred to as non-military or civilian crisis management.

The incapacity of international organizations to face such challenges led them to review their roles and tasks. The UN developed a new concept - peace operations - to cover both traditional military peacekeeping operations and other operations, such as various civilian police operations. The OSCE identified its role in the area as "the primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation." NATO included crisis management in its Washington Charter, together with closely related conflict prevention.

Based on a Finnish-Swedish initiative, the new Treaty of European Union from 1999 contains Article 17 which enables the Union to take concerted action in "humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in

crisis management." These so-called Petersberg tasks are now understood to cover not only the military component - which the Union is building with its new politico-military structures - but also civilian aspects.

Having the ability and the option to draw on the Member States' assets and capabilities in respect of both aspects of crisis management, the Union has a unique possibility to develop crisis management to cover both the military and civilian aspects, as well as their interfaces, in a balanced way. In order to achieve this, the Union has to develop its civilian and military capacities in parallel and in close cooperation. The assets are complementary and their sufficient interoperability should be ensured. The challenges are great for the Union itself and for its Member States, too. The developing common foreign and security policy provides a framework for EU action, which incorporates crisis management as one of its essential elements.

Military and civilian crisis management are different issues but, should the occasion arise, seamless cooperation has to be possible. Finland's experience of peacekeeping operations serves as a case in point in this respect. Finnish peacekeepers are reservists from a variety of civilian occupations, carrying with them wide experience and expertise acquired in the civilian world and able to take full advantage of their backgrounds, no matter whether the skills of a carpenter or a basketball coach are required. Whereas the peacekeepers of a superpower army prefer to stay heavily armed in their vehicles, without any dialogue with the locals other than that which is based on orders, Finnish peacekeepers try, whenever possible and without compromising their military capability, to build up cooperation with the local inhabitants, based on confidence, and to establish bridges - sometimes literally - between mutually suspicious, mutually hostile and sulky population groups. In this kind of peacebuilding, the boundary between military and civilian crisis management is at times as indistinct as a line drawn in water.

Civilian crisis management is an important part of foreign and security policy. The international community has decided to improve its capability to take joint action and cooperate in a more coordinated manner in conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict management. We are doing this in order to help solve international conflicts, but also because it is in our own interests. We want problems related to ethnic conflicts, local warfare and collapsed states to be addressed in an appropriate manner, trying to resolve the difficulties before they escalate and have a direct impact on our own societies. We want to unite our efforts in order to limit any possible damage to our own societies. Therefore, we shall use all the means at our disposal to ensure that the root causes of such conflicts are dealt with early enough and at their source.

As was noted before, civilian crisis management is one of the European Union's main foreign and security policy instruments. We should apply the tools at our disposal in this domain to every party's advantage and develop them further when needed. In order to succeed, we need to cooperate and try to contribute to the development of democratic societies with a sound economic foundation and based on respect for human rights. Assistance and expertise have to be sent to nations in crisis situations. The EU has undertaken to do everything in its power. It has promised to use all the tools at its disposal within the framework of the various EU pillars. That is why an EU committee was established as a cross-pillar Council working group to deal with the civilian aspects of crisis management.

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In the Feira European Council of June 2000, the EU decided to address four priority areas, namely the police, strengthening the rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection. Experiences from the Balkans and East Timor as well as from the rescue operations in Turkey and Mozambique had proved that there is an urgent need to increase the EU's capability in these fields. A progress report to the Nice European Council gave Sweden the mandate to launch an ambitious Presidency programme that has met with broad appreciation.

The main event during the Swedish Presidency is the first EU Police Capacity Conference convening in May. The Conference was to assess the Member States' preparedness, by which I refer to their capacity to send police officers to crisis operations and to decide on follow-up measures that would ensure that necessary progress is made in time. The Feira targets to be met by 2003 are ambitious: the EU has made a commitment to engage a total of 5,000 police officers, out of whom 1,000 would be deployable at a month's notice. In March, the EU sent as many as 3,600 police officers to such operations. Preliminary enquiries among the Member States have shown that countries without a central police organisation find it very difficult to increase their contributions. The enquiries have also revealed a clear political will to adhere to the joint commitments and to develop national resources accordingly.

One of the guiding principles governing the EU's priorities has been to bring added value to the international efforts in areas where the need is greatest. Law and order are the fundamental prerequisites of effective societies, but no society or community can implement law and order without the supporting judicial chain of judges, prosecutors and prisons, of which none is able to do a meaningful job without an adequate legal base. Therefore, it is of utmost practical importance to strengthen the rule of law. We hope that, by the Gothenburg Council, the EU will be able to agree on concrete targets in respect of both strengthening the rule of law and consolidating civilian administration.

In the fourth priority field - civil protection - the EU is ready to establish, in Gothenburg, quantitative targets to be met by 2003. The main challenge in this field is not lack of human resources, but lack of coordination, common financing and transport. The Member States can send large rescue teams at very short notice. However, the interoperability of these teams should be improved, and that calls for more common training. Even though the Commission has budgetary means which it can use to assist NGOs in their rescue operations, costs arising from the acquisition of any required rescue equipment and its transport to a catastrophe area will be borne by the Member States.

Civilian crisis management as such is not new but the term has now acquired a specific political sense. What is new is the focus on efforts to improve capabilities and coordination as well as the comprehensive approach with regard to crisis management. Similar expertise has been sent for years to developing countries by the UN and its specialized agencies, as well as by donor countries. The OSCE has also gained vast experience of field operations. Therefore, different organizations - both IGOs and NGOs - should engage in closer cooperation and agree on a possible division of labour and specialization in the future as well as share the field experience that they have accumulated over the years.

Conflict prevention is closely linked with crisis management - it both precedes and follows it. This was recognized in the Finnish Government's report on comprehensive development and organization of humanitarian and civil assets in 1997. Civilian crisis management is often considered to be a short-term activity.

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However, we should also call attention to the root causes of eventual crisis situations and act at the right time to prevent the escalation of crises. Therefore, one of the principal goals of Finnish international development assistance is conflict prevention. It is important to react to early warning signals immediately and to gather relevant information in a systematic and organized manner. The first signals are often given by local and international NGOs.

Civil-military cooperation is another closely related subject on the EU agenda. Militaries have developed special CIMIC concepts on that. It is a complicated task, although we have gained good experience of such practical cooperation and coordination during the fifty years that we have participated in UN-led peacekeeping operations.

In Kosovo, there is one military operation and hundreds of civilian players. Instead of looking at the weaknesses of the civilian side, a better starting point for more coordinated efforts might be to see how the military side could, by collecting information and intelligence, help the civilian side to get their activities started. Another task could be to ensure that national differences over CIMIC concepts do not lead to unfortunate local developmental differences, as has happened in Kosovo. Since the main goal of any crisis management operation is to create a secure environment for the local population to live in and become economically self-sufficient, it should be possible for civilian and military experts to interact whenever a crisis operation is planned. As far as I know, this has not been done so far but I do not see any obstacle to it. It might be worthwhile to study the possibilities arising from improved cooperation in the field of transport logistics.

Crisis management operations take many forms and change over time. This applies to both military and civilian crisis management. The right timing of activities is even more important on the civilian side. For example, international police forces might be in charge of police tasks at the beginning - and have an executive mandate - and later, after the local police have been trained, the latter will take on responsibility and monitor and advise the local authorities. In order to address such changeable challenges, more knowledge needs to be acquired, inter alia, of small arms and light weapons and of border control.

The main deficit in the field of civilian crisis management concerns the lack of human resources. These activities are run in crisis areas by the same specialists as are usually responsible for the normal functioning of society. No country has highly qualified experts in reserve, waiting to be sent abroad on international missions for lengthy periods of time without any effect on domestic services. What can be done?

In order to make the most of our scarce resources, more attention could and should be devoted to the appropriate planning of civilian operations. To this end, we should not accept the prevailing situation where all international organisations lack planning capacity. This is true of both the UN and its agencies - in spite of their long experience in the field - and it is particularly true of the EU. Both the EU Council Secretariat and the Commission are understaffed. It is a matter of great concern that the civilian planning capacity has not been developed to match the military staff, whose numbers have been on the increase within the EU since March of last year.

These are my thoughts and concerns on a few topical aspects of civilian crisis management. I would very much appreciate it if we could analyse not only the shortcomings of civilian crisis management, but also highlight aspects that might

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have contributed to positive results. We certainly learn from common lessons but we should also try to encourage each other by taking note of the best practices. It is hard to keep people motivated to pursue a policy in the long run, if it appears to be in vain. It is important to cultivate hope and encouragement in order to meet the great challenges.

# Non-Military Crisis Management as a Security Means in the EU

## Jaakko Blomberg

*Under-Secretary of State, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland*

Crisis management is a concept that can be read in a narrow or in a broad way. If we take crisis as a broad concept, much of our policies, internal or external, can be seen as crisis management. That would not make much sense as a guide for policy planning and making. Yet there is a current tendency to widen the scope of concepts like security and peace. I fully understand this tendency. The cold war forced a narrow view of what peace and security mean: the absence of war in the traditional, military sense. Security was freedom from coercion and it was often based on the balance of military power.

In today's Europe, there is no overall confrontation of hostile political and ideological camps. Instead, there are local or regional situations, where the threat of war or broad-scale violence is present. True, the potential of a confrontation between Russia and NATO is there, and the provision is still being made for deterring or winning such a conflict. But as the possibility for such a conflict is remote, a wide area of normal international exchange is free from the threat or use of force. In other words, in the Europe of today, security in the traditional, narrow sense is not threatened, except in certain regional or local contexts where an ethnic conflict may be the source of tension. This, of course, is not a minor exception.

Today, peace and security are seen as a web of interaction and co-operation, as the fulfilment of common and positive goals and the prevention of fundamental conflicts of interest. The focus is increasingly on fighting problems that are common to all: trans-border criminality, drug trafficking, communicable diseases, environmental hazards, etc. Societies and economies cannot function properly if those problems are rampant. Moreover, security involves the individual as never before: he or she is entitled to be free from such disturbances, be they international or domestic by origin.

Hence, the international community - admittedly, another tricky concept - is now pursuing security in this broad sense. Peace and security are not complete or satisfactory if they are not broadly based. On this, there is a wide consensus, more solid perhaps in Europe than in some other geopolitical situations. Policies and approaches are being developed keeping this concept of comprehensive security in mind. Much of it consists of lessons learnt from experience, all too often from mistakes.

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The European Union has accepted the challenge. Internally, it is developing common policies for creating a zone of freedom and justice, relevant for the citizens. The summit of Tampere in October 1999 remains a recent landmark in this respect. As a broad embodiment of the international community the Union has a vested interest in preserving peace and security in its neighbourhood and beyond. It is by nature interested in peace and security in the comprehensive sense. In its vocabulary, stability is a key word and closely connected with political, social and economic transition. One can say that the Union aims at spreading its own image: integration based on democracy, freedom and justice and the related goals. It is promoting economic and social progress which is balanced and sustainable.

From the above, it follows that the EU is interested in and has an understanding and capability for developing methods of crisis management in the broad sense, both civilian and military. In relation to conflicts or crises, the external crisis-related activities of the EU can be divided in three: prevention, management and post-conflict action. In what follows, I am offering a few comments on each of these.

In the broad sense, much of the external policies of the European Union fall under the concept of **conflict prevention**. Here, the emphasis is on the civilian, non-military aspects, but not exclusively so. In essence, it is about demonstrating to all of its partners that it pays to observe the common rules relating to human rights, the rule of law, good governance and the peaceful settlement of disputes.

Yet conflict prevention should be seen as an activity focused on identifiable sources of conflict or dispute. This is often easier said than done. It is not always a simple task to identify and determine at an early stage the source of the trouble. And it is not always a simple task to intervene from the outside in an intra-state or even inter-state conflict. There are norms of international law that govern such situations. In case of a failed state or the collapse of an organised government, an international intervention might make common sense, but legal grounds are lacking or underdeveloped. Kosovo in the spring of 1999 was a case in point and remains a subject of study and even a bitter controversy over what could have been done better to prevent the humanitarian catastrophes that ensued.

On this point, the research community has an opportunity to contribute with clear and sound ideas. Without making judgement on any current efforts, one can perhaps say that the international community is often applying the concepts and methods used in a previous conflict rather than facing the realities of a new one. Despite a plenty of lessons learned in the Balkans during the past decade, there are few reliable methods to draw from when the international community - and the EU in particular - is now coping with the current issues in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Kosovo, Montenegro) and Macedonia.

The importance of these situations cannot be over-estimated. There are good reasons to stick to the principle of respecting the existing state borders. But, as in the case of the Albanian populations, this principle comes with a cost. Consistency in international affairs is a hard rule to apply. Theory is no good guide.

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If prevention fails, **means of crisis management** must be resorted to. The principal asset of the EU will be in the broad variety of the instruments it can apply in any given situation. Understanding that many of the instruments are still to be developed, the EU will be a versatile actor in international crisis management. It will have a rich toolbox. Beside the military aspects of a capability for crisis management being developed within the Common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), work is under way in four civilian areas: policing, the rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection. It will take years to reach the targets that have been set but the determination to do it is there. Significant concrete progress has taken place in the area of a policing capability as the first priority.

Non-military, civilian methods are to be preferred as they are less expensive than military methods but in real life there is rarely such a luxury of choice. The relative significance of the military and non-military instruments of crisis management always depends on the nature of the situation. If the crisis becomes violent, military means may be needed. It is equally clear that if the origin of the conflict is, say, of an ethnic kind, non-military methods are needed. Naturally, civilian methods should always be preferred if there is a choice.

The relationship between the civilian method and the military method is a crucial factor, but it will have to be determined according to the character and needs of the crisis at hand. Coordination of the overall action is another key function.

The third phase of crisis management is **post-conflict action**. It has become a commonplace to stress the need for the international community to be able to find an exit from a crisis situation, the termination of the operation. In practice, this has proven to be difficult indeed.

The parties to the conflict tend to develop a dependency on the outside operators or managers. The presence of the crisis managers provides parties with an excuse not to face the realities of the settlement of the dispute as a way back to normalcy.

The European Union has a unique asset in that it can provide the parties of the conflict a real incentive to settlement. The EU can promise the parties that they will become partners with the Union, including assistance in reconstruction and economic and social reform. And like in the case of the Western Balkans, the Union can open the prospect of membership.

In all of the stages of a crisis management operation the EU benefits from cooperation with third parties, non-member states, international and non-governmental organisations. Depending on the nature of the crisis, the EU need not necessarily be the leading operator.

So far the focus has been on a social or political conflict, on a man-made crisis. There can also be a crisis originating from a **natural disaster**. The significance of such crises to the society concerned can be enormous and therefore call for broad external assistance. In the earthquakes in Turkey and Greece in 1999 the management of relief operations with international involvement had a profound impact on the relations between Turkey and Greece as well as Turkey's standing as a member of the European family.

Jaakko Blomberg

By way of **conclusion**, one can stress that a pointed distinction between the military and the civilian in crisis management is not useful. While resource development must focus on each special case, and policy planning must be comprehensive. The European Union has the benefit of a broad competence although some of its assets remain underdeveloped and the decision-making is sometimes cumbersome. Planning and management must be crisis oriented, not resource oriented.

# European Crisis Management from the Norwegian Perspective

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European security in its broadest sense is increasingly being faced with new challenges. Some of these are military, others are non-military. The challenges are often interlinked, and they often require combined military and non-military responses. This topic is more relevant than ever before.

In this short paper I will touch on Norway's position in relation to the European Union's efforts to improve its crisis management capacity. I will then look at the interdependence between military and non-military crisis management, the various means of implementing crisis management and Norway's ability to be an active contributor in this regard. Finally I will deal with the need for cooperation and coordination between all partners in European crisis management, whether they are members or non-members of the EU. Although a non-member of the Union, Norway is defenitely not an "outsider" in European crisis management.

The European Union is in itself a giant peace project. It aims to prevent differences between members from developing into violent conflict. As such the EU has been a great success. Economic integration has served as an effective security instrument. But Europe as a whole has not been exempt from violent conflicts. The political will to engage in effective preventive diplomacy has so far been insufficient and the tools have been inadequate. The same goes for the will and the means of exercising political leadership once a crisis has broken out.

Norway strongly supports the EU's efforts to create effective crisis management instruments that will supplement those of organizations like the UN, NATO, the OSCE and the Council of Europe. I should like to underline, though, what we think the European Security and Defence Policy is, and what it is not. The ESDP is an attempt to enable the Union to carry out the so-called Petersberg tasks. These are humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and peacemaking. The ESDP does *not* involve the establishment of a European army, nor does it involve territorial defence.

Let me quote from the Presidency Report to the Nice Summit: "As regards the member states concerned, NATO remains the basis of the collective defence of its members and will continue to play an important role in crisis management. The development of the ESDP will contribute to the vitality of a renewed transatlantic link. This development will also lead to a genuine strategic partnership between the EU and NATO in the management of crises with due regard for the two organisations' decision-making autonomy."

The typical conflict today is internal. Its roots are often complex and difficult to handle. Sustainable solutions are not obvious. Internal conflicts are normally not seen as a threat to the outside world. Therefore the international community does

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not offer good enough assistance at an early enough stage to help defuse a crisis before it erupts into violent conflict.

Effective crisis management requires careful preparation and a comprehensive strategy. Military action will not in itself create tolerance between ethnic or religious groups in former Yugoslavia. On the other hand, the conflicts in the Balkans have been of such a nature that the use of military power has been necessary in order to enable the use of civilian means required for their resolution.

The measures of today's new type of peace operation can be divided into three categories: military measures, civilian security measures and other civilian measures.

The task of the *first* category is to end open conflict if other measures fail, and to prevent new military confrontations. This ranges from traditional peacekeeping to the more forceful peacemaking.

The *second* category deals with civilian security, law and order. This kind of intervention is called for when a state is unable to uphold the functions of police, courts and prisons. Kosovo comes to mind here. It is important, however, to distinguish between advisory, monitoring and training functions on the one hand and assuming responsibility for executive police functions on the other.

The *third* category of measures covers everything from the establishment of new political institutions, holding of free and fair elections, and independent media, to investment and rebuilding of infrastructure and preparing people for a post-conflict life.

Strengthening our capability in this area is a priority task for the Norwegian government. Our aim is for Norway to be able to offer a comprehensive and integrated package of tools for crisis management, including military and civilian resources. But even with such a comprehensive national package, the best approach will normally be to engage in close cooperation with other partners. Norway has been one of the major contributors to the peacekeeping activities of the UN during the last fifty years. More than 60,000 Norwegians have participated in UN peacekeeping operations, including all the major ones. Today we have 1,400 Norwegian soldiers in Kosovo, including the general in command of the NATO-led Kosovo Force, or KFOR.

It will be a long time before KFOR can safely withdraw from its law enforcement functions in Kosovo. But it is of vital importance that the inhabitants of Kosovo have a well-trained police force that they can regard as their own. One of the primary tasks of Norwegian participation in peace operations has been the training and education of local police. When we chaired the OSCE in 1999 the organization was given responsibility for establishing the Kosovo Police Academy, and later Norway seconded instructors to the Academy.

Since 1989 more than 500 Norwegian police officers have participated in more than 20 peace operations in 16 countries. As of today 73 police officers are part of 14 different international missions. This amounts to about one per cent of our standing police force. These are very well qualified men and women, with more than six years of duty after their three-year training. They have also undergone further basic training for peace operations and mission-specific training.

We have established a stand-by system which permits rapid mobilization and deployment of civilian expert personnel to support humanitarian operations, institution-building, democracy-building and rebuilding of war-shattered societies. Many of those currently involved in the Balkans have been recruited through the Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights, or NORDEM. Under this system, volunteer experts in a number of areas are listed in a database. Most of them are available at short notice. As a rule the personnel serve for a period of six months, though longer periods of service are relatively common.

Norway is also a major contributor to crisis management in financial terms, through the UN system, the OSCE, the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, and not least non-governmental organizations. The work of the NGOs is vitally important. Without their efforts and commitment, the prospects for peace and development would in many places be less promising.

More effective civilian crisis management not only requires more resources. Equally important is how we use the available resources. Careful planning and coordinated implementation are essential. If it is to be really effective, European crisis management should not be a task for the European Union alone. All European countries have an important role to play. Nor is crisis management a task for governments alone. I again stress the essential contributions of the private sector.

We are very pleased that crisis management has become a new priority area for the EU. This is a highly relevant way of meeting the comprehensive security challenges that are increasingly facing us today. And thanks not least to the Nordic countries in the EU, civilian crisis management is receiving more and more attention.

As part of civilian crisis management, preventive diplomacy should play a prominent role. Addressing root causes of a political, economic, social or even environmental nature is essential. Thereby we can better prevent, contain and resolve conflicts before they reach the stage where military measures are required.

The EU Summit in Nice in December laid down a framework for the involvement of third countries in the ESDP. This applies to the candidate countries and a few others, and in particular to the six European NATO allies that are not EU members. Norway has welcomed the Nice decisions as a good basis for strengthening European crisis management capabilities, in both the military and the civilian field. Our position is that the EU must show an open and inclusive attitude towards non-EU allies and others. The EU must demonstrate a willingness to develop a real partnership with those non-members that are ready for it. In the end it will be Europe's joint strength and capability that matters, and no country should be prevented from contributing.

In connection with the EU's capability conference in November last year, Norway announced a contribution of up to 3,500 personnel to the military Headline Goal. We will also be offering substantial contributions to civilian crisis management. In the first instance this will be the civilian police, an area to which the EU rightly gives first priority, and later also judges, attorneys, a functional legal system. We are in close dialogue with the EU on this already.

The Nordic countries have for many years cooperated closely between themselves. I think it is fair to say that we have to some extent set an example to others. Effective crisis management requires flexibility, or cooperation in different frameworks. Norway therefore took the initiative over a year ago to expand this

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area of Nordic cooperation so as to include Germany, a country that has become more and more closely involved in civilian crisis management, not least in the Balkans.  In September 2000 a seminar on this subject was organized at the Nordic Embassy complex in Berlin.  It was attended by very high-level participants from the six foreign ministries, from other parts of government, and from a number of NGOs.

- The idea is to enhance the national capabilities for crisis management and peacekeeping,
- to provide added value to national efforts through improved coordination and cooperation,
- to improve the ability of the participating states to contribute to the crisis management activities of international organizations,
- and to improve the ability of the participating states to work together in the field.

We think these goals can be achieved in a number of ways: cooperation on training and preparations for civilian police operations; the exchange of views on recruitment of personnel; cooperation on personnel databases; joint training programmes; discussing how to achieve more rapid deployment; cooperation on transport arrangements and material support for crisis management operations; discussing lessons learnt.  And not least, how to involve and cooperate with NGOs.

Through this type of cooperation we can avoid duplication of effort and ensure a better division of labour, we can strengthen our ability to respond rapidly, in short we can together become more relevant and more effective in each particular case.

This emerging Nordic-German cooperation has no institutional structures, it is based on the active use of informal networks.  It involves NGOs actively - and this is one of its great strengths.  It is in no way a substitute for participation in EU-led civilian crisis management.  But it does add to overall European crisis management by increasing the capacity and flexibility of Germany and the Nordic countries in this field.

# Bridging Theory & Practice in Crisis Management: The Swedish Experience

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## Introduction

Scholarly research and political practice explicitly devoted to crisis management have emerged simultaneously. Crisis management has always been an element in political practice, and several classical studies were published twenty or thirty years ago (Allison, 1971, 1999; Brecher, 1978; Lebow, 1981; Snyder and Diesing, 1977). Today, however, the field is rapidly becoming more salient and institutionalised in both academia and policymaking, particularly in Europe. The ECMA (The European Crisis Management Academy) held its first biannual meeting in 1999. In the policy world, the most obvious example is the recent development of a military as well as non-military crisis management capability within the European Union. Crisis management has become common currency in contemporary Euro-speech. This parallel development of crisis management as a separate orientation in research as well as in policy begs the question of how these two worlds interact, how they shape and influence each other.

The overarching aim of this paper is to elaborate the conditions under which scholarly research on crisis management might contribute to policy practice. The theory-practice relationship obviously involves a lot more than this, for instance whether scholarly research even under the most benign circumstances can contribute to practice. Perhaps it is in the very nature of policy practice to be haphazard, incrementalistic and short sighted, rather than systematic, reflective and foreseeing? Perhaps it is pure luxury to think of scholars making policy recommendations on issues about which they have only theoretical knowledge and seldom or never any first hand experience? Or is the whole idea of contributing to practice flawed not on functional but on normative grounds? Perhaps scholars should resist the siren song of policy relevance for their own reasons - to protect their integrity and perspective - assets that arguably require distance rather than proximity? Though we have chosen to focus on the conditions under which scholarship may contribute to practice, we are not unaware of these additional aspects and problems of interaction between theory and practice. Moreover, this interaction works both ways - the experience of practitioners is often enriching theory.

Therefore, we consider contribution to practice as a much wider concept than simply giving recommendations on policy alternatives. Research results can be disseminated into the practical sphere through many channels. One such avenue

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is through writing textbooks, giving lectures, arranging courses and simulations. It is not only through impacting directly upon the formulation and execution of policy or through engagement in public debates that the scholar can contribute to 'better practice'. Not to be forgotten is the classic academic responsibility of teaching and advising generations of students; the future practitioners in the field. Furthermore, a close relationship between scholarship and policymaking should not be equated with theory influencing practice. Not every contribution from academia is based on scientific research. We argue, however, that teaching and training, as opposed to other forms of interaction with practitioners, are particularly useful for communicating research to practitioners. The reason is that in these situations, it is the scholar rather than the practitioner that is the authority, and it is the culture of academe rather than politics that dominate.

In what follows, the general debate on the relationship between theory and practice in international relations is reviewed. This involves asking if there is something special about crisis management that sets it apart from other fields or from more general notions of relations between theory and practice. The answer to this, it will be argued, is both yes and no. There are indeed some features of crisis management research that make it especially relevant for policy practice. We attempt to show this by reconstructing the history of CM Europe (Crisis Management Europe) - a Swedish crisis management project developed in close cooperation between academia and government.

However, there is still a need for a conscious method of communication and translation from theory to practice, and vice versa. Moreover, despite its special features, crisis management studies encounter many of the general obstacles in bridge building between theory and practice. Some of these have to do with the different organising principles, cultures, and preferences of academia and the policy world.

## Widening the Concept of Contributing to Practice

We make the case for a widened concept of contributing to practice. The roles in which scholarly contributions can be produced goes beyond providing policy analyses, acting as crisis manager, mediator, or commenting on current events and policies. Teaching and training present and future policymakers are equally important channels for contributing to practice. Though this point has been made before (Hill, 1994; Smith, 1997: 509; Said, 1995; Wyn Jones, 1999), it is our impression that the still dominating image is that of an expert lending princely advice on how to act in a given situation. Though taking part directly in a crisis management process as analyst or decisionmaker are very significant avenues of influencing practice, we would like to emphasise some of the more subtle channels.

One important bridge between the sphere of research and the sphere of practice is through teaching and training of present and future operatives in the area. University teachers meet and get to know a considerable number of students/voters/future policymakers. The impact a teacher might have on the political commitments of students should not be underestimated. When we have the privilege to train civil and military leaders, as in the work at the National Defence College, we have the opportunity to frame the mindsets and influence the operational repertoires of future crisis managers of an entire country. This is quite different from formulating or implementing policy, or engaging in public debate. Teaching and training imply a long-time perspective, quite different from the

shortsightedness characterising the policy process. While an actual crisis management is carried out over a few days or even a few hours, research and teaching requires months and years. Being free of the responsibilities of doing something to solve an acute problem, teachers and researchers have time for reflection and perspective, things that are pure luxury during an actual crisis.

Scholars are seldom in a position to redirect policy or reallocate resources. Academics turned policymakers, like Kissinger, are very rare. Power as force or coercion is therefore not available to most academics. Through teaching and training, however, they may shape the preferences and worldviews of their audience. This approximates to Steven Lukes' third dimension of power - the power to influence the minds of people - that is quite different from enforcing policies against the will of others (Lukes, 1974). This is about socialisation, or trying to *convince* people, as opposed to persuasion and coercion. Education is one of the best channels for achieving this.

In our perspective, teaching and training are the primary vehicles for communicating research to practitioners. These channels avoid the indirect and arbitrary nature that usually characterises interaction between scholars and practitioners. When scholars act as policy analysts, advisors, experts and speechwriters, they might have a greater impact on the actual formulation and implementation of policy in a given situation. However, as argued above, the influence is not only arbitrary and indirect, but also rarely based on scientific research. In teaching and training, the influence of the scholars is much more substantial and also more systematically based on research - given that this is what the scholars wants to contribute with. The reason is that in teaching and training it is the scholar who sets the norms rather than the policymaker, and the culture of academe is more likely to dominate than the culture of politics.

Even when the situation is under control by the scholar as in teaching and training, impact on practice is not guaranteed. The type of knowledge and the way it is communicated are also important. A noteworthy example of scholarly competence that can be communicated is *conceptual clarification*. This can be illustrated by the experience of Annika Björkdahl, a young doctoral candidate writing a PhD thesis on conflict management and simultaneously working as an official at the Foreign Ministry. She told us that she had managed to influence the official Swedish definition of conflict prevention, and that her proposal was based on her own research and understanding of the academic literature on the subject. In addition, she successfully contributed to making a 'culture of conflict prevention' a highlighted aspect of the official policy (Swedish Foreign Ministry, 1999). Another example is professor emeritus and then senior analyst Nils Andrén (2000). He gave an illustration from the early days of his career at the Defence Research Establishment. Once he had commented on a draft of a policy paper including definitions of types of conflict, and successfully convinced the responsible people that a 'cold war' is not a type of war - which the authors had been arguing - but actually a peacetime condition.

The emphasis on conceptual clarification corresponds to the first of George's three criteria of 'policy relevant' research: conceptualization of strategies, generic knowledge, and actor-specific behavioural models. *A conceptual model of strategies* provides a general understanding of the requirements for diagnosing strategic problems. It identifies the critical variables to be considered in policymaking, and identifies the general logic of how strategies work in typified situations. However, it cannot predict specific outcomes in actual situations. *Generic knowledge* is derived

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from systematic empirical observations and experience. Importantly, generic knowledge should take the form of conditional rather than probabilistic generalizations, for policymaking must be adapted to particular situations rather general probabilities. *Actor-specific behavioural models* emphasize the idiosyncrasies of particular actors that policymakers try to influence. They replace the superficial assumptions of general rationality that policymakers as well as rational choice theorists attribute to other actors. (George, 1993: 115-134, 137-38)

The three types of knowledge contribute more to the diagnosis of a problem, than to the prescription of viable policies. It is precisely this kind of situational analysis that policymakers need and which scholars can contribute. This is also what crisis management research can provide, as will be discussed in the subsequent section.

Moreover, these types of knowledge are only an input to, and not a substitute for, the judgements which policymakers have to employ when formulating and implementing policies (George, 1993: 21, 116, 138-39). In contrast to scholars, policymakers cannot only consider the analytical rationality of a suggested policy, but must also take into account political support, trade-offs, timing, and other policymaking resources. The emphasis on scholarly knowledge as input rather than substitution is nicely captured in George's model.

We will now combine these general notions and insights with experience from the CM Europe project. Reconstructing the history and experience of this ongoing project illustrates special features of crisis management research and training as well as general opportunities and obstacles of bridging theory and practice. First, however, the national context of the general relationship between academia and policymaking will be briefly reviewed.

## The National Context of Theory & Practice: Sweden in Comparative Perspective

Scholars from US and British contexts heavily dominate the literature on the relationship between academia and policymaking.[1] The result of this is that some of the observations made in this debate are presented as generalisations, while actually being representative of very specific communities. Therefore the idiosyncrasies of national contexts must be highlighted - a prerequisite for discussing the experience of crisis management research in Sweden.

The US represents one end of the scale, where scholars and policy-makers have many personal contacts and institutionalized opportunities for going back and forth between the two worlds. The open, transparent and high-turnover nature of the US governmental system has made it possible for many academics to practise what they are theorizing about, and for practitioners to do research about what the have been practising. These individuals, often referred to as 'in-and-outers', are going back and forth between, on the one hand, a university or an institute, and, on the other hand, the White House, the State and Defense Departments (Rosenau and Sapin, 1994: 126-27). It is noteworthy that these meeting places and individuals to a large extent are located in or nearby Washington DC.

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[1] There are hardly any studies available of the relationship between academia and policymaking in other countries. On exception is the anthology edited by Girard, Eberwein and Webb (1994), in which not only the US and Britain are examined, but also Germany, France, Russia, Austria, the Netherlands and Sweden.

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In Britain the interaction between academics and practitioners is also relatively frequent, though not to the same extent as in the USA. A majority of British IR scholars have personal contacts with foreign policy practitioners. Most of them meet with their counterparts on a regular basis, and quite a few feel they have had an impact on British foreign policy. At the same time, however, 'mutually negative images' of academics and practitioners prevail in Britain, and the interaction appears to be more valued by the scholars than the practitioners. In addition, for instance the Research and Analysis Department of the Foreign Office provides policy-makers with an in-house capability, which might result in a feeling of self-sufficiency. Nevertheless, the general picture is one of relatively frequent interaction between scholars and practitioners in Britain, particularly in or within the vicinity of London (Webb, 1994b).

One important reason for the comparatively close relationship between academia and policy-making in the USA and Britain is that both countries have very large communities of IR scholars, and also a more diversified IR scholarship than in most countries. As Eberwein puts it: 'The greater the internal differentiation and thus the degree of specialization, the greater the frequency of exchange with practitioners' (Eberwein, 1994: 159).

The situation is radically different in other countries. In France, the frequency of interaction between academics and practitioners is almost negligible. Girard describes this with reference to the incompatibility of the traditional roles of state elites and intellectuals in France (Girard, 1994b). French practitioners, especially the foreign policy-makers, have developed a particular elitist culture, the majority of which have gone through the National School for Administration (the ENA). Academics, on the other hand, have nurtured a traditional French intellectual role as critics of authority. The lack of interaction between scholars and practitioners is even more apparent in Russia, although the reason here is mainly the weakness of newborn academia in general and IR scholarship in particular (Tiulin, 1994). Austria also shows a rather limited exchange between scholars and practitioners. Though some contacts exist, these have hardly developed into the advisory or expert functions that can be observed in other countries (Quendler, 1994).

Somewhere in between these two extremes we find the Nordic countries, Germany, and the Netherlands. In these countries there are many examples of both formal and informal bridge building. Advisory bodies, working groups and commissions of inquiry consisting of both scholars and practitioners are quite common. In addition, institutes of international affairs and foreign policy think tanks are important meeting places between the two worlds. (Eberwein and Hörsch, 1994; Everts, 1994; Nygren, 1994)

In Sweden, for example, a great many scholars from all over the country participate as experts in public commissions of inquiry, as commentators in the media, and as teachers and trainers of future decisionmakers. Indeed, it could be seen as part of Swedish academic culture to contribute to practice, particularly by providing expert advice to public commissions of inquiry. In contrast to the dominating position of Washington DC and London in the US and British contexts, respectively, it is hardly a controversial statement that Stockholm does not dominate the interaction between academia and policymaking in Sweden. Though we cannot provide compelling evidence, we may at least give some illustrations. Of this an example is the Department of Political Science at Göteborg university, located on the Swedish west coast. Without doubt, the members of this department are some of the most visible in the Swedish media (Bjereld, 2000; Eriksson, 2000). In addition, several of

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them take on the role as experts in governmental commissions. Of this merely one example is Ulf Bjereld who at this time of writing participates in the governmental commission on the intelligence service. Another example is the Department of Political at Lund University, located in the south of Sweden. Prominent members of this department, such as Lars-Göran Stenelo, Christopher Jönsson and Magnus Jerneck, have contributed to several governmental commissions of inquiry. In addition, for several years Jönsson has been a member of the Foreign Ministry board that appoints applicants to the diplomatic career.

These observations contradict Bertil Nygren's analysis of the role perceptions of Swedish academics with IR as their specialty (Nygren, 1994). It is important to address this, since Nygren is the only one who has published a fairly recent account of this subject in the English language. In his view, there is very huge gap between scholars and practitioners. He basis his conclusion on an awkward illustration of the Swedish institute of International Affairs (SIIA) which in his view has failed to build a bridge between theory and practice (Nygren, 1994: 105-107). First, Nygren's account of the SIIA is misleading. He disregards the fact that several institutional and individual links exist both between universities and the SIIA, and between the SIIA and the policy world. As an example of the former, an ambitious research programme on foreign and security policy, funded by the Foreign Ministry, has existed for some ten years, and has produced not only a long series of research reports (including several doctoral dissertations), but has also systematically communicated the results to the world of policy. The latter has been formalized through a consecutive series of seminars and workshops with researchers as well as practitioners participating. In addition, on a weekly basis distinguished academics as well as prominent policymakers from all over the world hold public lectures and engage in debates at the SIIA. Whether this has made an impact on actual policy is another question, but the SIIA is definitely a linking pin between academia and the world of policy.

Second, Nygren makes the fatal mistake of generalizing about academia and policymaking in Sweden by discussing only the SIIA. That there are several other channels of contact has already been indicated. The following section on crisis management research and training gives further insight into how scholarship and practice are bridged in this country.

# Bridging Gaps & Building Communities: The CM Europe Project

Crises and crisis management have always fascinated students, scholars and practitioners. The classic exemplar of this genre is the Essence of Decision (1971, 1999) by Graham Allison. The Cuba crisis inspired a group at Harvard to analyse in depth this case of highly dramatic and in the end effective crisis management. It has been widely used as a text, also in Sweden. Policy makers have drawn on the analytical approaches of the volume to sort out the complex features of policy making in high stakes situations. Bureaucratic politics, organizational inertia and balanced critical deliberations within small groups are different avenues of research coming out of this book. To the Swedish group the 1981 Whiskey on the Rocks submarine crisis served as the point of inspiration for a major investment in the study and training of crisis management eventually leading to a special centre at the National Defence College.

As we launched the CM Baltic/Europe programme in close collaboration with the Swedish Agency for Civil Emergency Planning, our governmental partners and we agreed upon four closely related goals:

1. To promote the development of crisis studies (as a multi-disciplinary academic subfield) in Sweden.
2. To promote national and transnational dialogue between the scholarly and practitioner communities in Europe.
3. To encourage scholars and practitioners from other European countries (especially from the new democracies of Northern Europe) to document, analyse, and share knowledge of their crisis experiences.
4. To promote confidence building and the development of a capacity for political/operational collaboration among the governments of the region.

Let us discuss each of the goals and the steps taken thus far in their pursuit in turn.

## Developing Academic Crisis Studies in Sweden

As we began this program, relatively little work on civil crisis management was being done at Swedish universities in the field, especially in political science - our own home discipline. In order to build networks among researchers and to reach out to colleagues doing similar work in other disciplines, a number of conferences and workshops were organized. In particular, we found a small community of scholars working on problems of crisis communication, risk perception/analysis, and leadership.

In addition to our efforts to collaborate with several existing centres of excellence in Sweden, we chose to focus on senior undergraduate and junior graduate students as a pool of potential talent for building our subfield. Over a period of several years, we offered the best and brightest students we could find the opportunity to participate in our collaborative research effort. Candidates were asked to prepare case research proposals (under our supervision and following guidelines given to them). The most promising candidates and proposals were given the opportunity to participate in a two-day training workshop held at a conference facility near Stockholm and subsequently to revise their proposals. The revised proposals were considered as application for modest 'stimulation grants'. The recruits conducted their research over a roughly six-month period stretching from the end of spring term to the middle of the autumn term. During this period the new research team met frequently for seminars and had extensive opportunities to meet with the project leaders for collective and individual advising. At the end of the research cycle, a few of the most outstanding case writers were offered an opportunity to work on a part time basis for the programme as apprentice analysts and trainers. As of early 2001, three such predominantly Swedish case research groups have been run involving nearly forty such young talents. Over a dozen outstanding journeymen crisis analysts have been hired on a part or full time basis. One PhD has been completed with the support of the programme, four analysts have been accepted to highly competitive doctoral programmes, and many more have continued on to Masters studies or entry-level positions in the Swedish public administration.

## Promoting Dialogue Between the Two Cultures

Ironically, a scientific method - if it is the right method - can help to build bridges to practice. We are, of course, referring to the case research method. Like us, practitioners tend to reflect upon experience in terms of cases - which serve as

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precedents, sources of strategic and tactical inspiration/warning, and performance benchmarks.  As is well known, practitioners vary in terms of their knowledge of history and the degree of sophistication with which they draw upon it (Neustadt and May, 1988; Vertzberger, 1990; Khong, 1992).  As a rule however, they tend to have respect for this type of knowledge and are sympathetic to our own more systematic efforts to collect and draw lessons from practical experience - to develop a 'case bank' to be exploited for both scientific and policy relevant purposes.  In doing case research, practitioners are a tremendous asset as sources of information about cases and contexts under study.  We draw (not exclusively, of course) on their guidance in finding documents, interpreting institutional practices, identifying potential informants, and as participant observer interviewees.  This type of situational information clearly corresponds to George's notion of *generic knowledge*, emphasising conditional rather than probabilistic generalisations.

As noted earlier, not only the type of knowledge but also the forms of communication are important if contributing to practice is to be successful.  We have experimented with forms of collaborative oral history projects - such as the witness symposium in which participants are asked to engage in a collective process of reconstructing and reflecting upon major cases.  Not only our choice of method, but also our conceptualisation/operationalisation has stood us in good stead.  Our approach to process tracing emphasizes reconstructing crisis decision and communication problems as they appeared to participants.  Thus the analytical narratives we produce tend to resonate with practitioners who have grappled with acute problems such as those uncovered in our analyses.  This approximates to what George refers to as *conceptualisation of strategies* and *actor-specific behavioural models*, ie a framework diagnosing strategic problems, and an emphasis of the idiosyncrasies of actors involved in actual cases.

Furthermore, the combination of case and problem-based approaches has another virtue.  It lends itself to being used as a resource for developing active learning tools such as teaching cases, role-playing exercises, and full-blown crisis simulations.  Researchers working within the CM Europe programme have organized a substantial number of exercises with good result for practitioners at all levels (from top level ministerial officials to local community leaders) and sectors (eg Chancellory, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Industry, Minstry of Agriculture etc) of national government.

Trainers using other means to develop training tools often grapple with the problem that potential trainees find training scenarios or hypothetical cases contrived and unrealistic.  The research-based approach we have adopted circumvents this problem nicely.  Our training tools 'feel real' - because they are grounded in and inspired by real contingencies identified in our research and in that of our colleagues.  Again, this illustrates the importance of generic knowledge.  Our experience suggests that Swedish and other European practitioners are increasingly receptive to this kind of approach - which can provide them with virtual experience and, perhaps even more importantly, with a point of departure for qualified peer dialogue, reflection, and experience sharing.

Academics have an important role to play in such training exercises and seminars.  We can bring a broad perspective to bear and help to stimulate and lift the practical dialogue.  However, a certain sensitivity is required.  Both academics and practitioners must be sensitive to the starting points and vocabularies of the other.  Jargon must be explained; unnecessary abstractions must be avoided.  Necessary

abstractions should be explained in a respectful manner and empirically illustrated. For academics, theorizing often becomes an end in of itself - a kind of academic art form that brings intra-academic status and respect. For practitioners, theory, or generalized knowledge (George, 1993), is useful only if it represents a tool or resource that can be applied to help them cope with the practical problems already on the agenda. Thus the relevance of theoretical knowledge should not be assumed, but rather demonstrated in the sense that theory helps to specify and points to possible solutions of recurring practical problems.

Furthermore, let us point out that the experience-based knowledge of qualified practitioners - while gathered in and communicated in a manner very different from that of academic experts - is worthy of our respect. We should be aware that we have at least as much to learn from as to teach the world of practice. Indeed, as argued above, interaction between scholars and practitioners is often enriching theory more than practice (Rosenau and Sapin, 1994: 131-33; Webb, 1994b: 90). The intuitive notions and implicit/explicit vocabulary used by the skilled practitioner is often insightful and a tremendous resource for researchers trying to comprehend and conceptualise the world of practice. The rules of thumb and proto-generalizations of practitioners can often be easily translated into hypotheses and propositions that can be evaluated through systematic scientific research.

## Encouraging Others

From the outset, we considered our Swedish activities as a pilot case for a broader, regional effort that was key part of our collaboration with our governmental counterparts. Essentially, we were charged with establishing a partnership for research (the phrase was inspired by the NATO's regional outreach activities under the Partnership for Peace Programme). The idea was to encourage scholars and practitioners from around the region to step up their efforts to systematically document, analyse and share information about their experiences of national crisis management. It was decided for a variety of reasons that Estonia would be the target of our initial outreach efforts. Both academic and policy-oriented networks were mobilized. Things moved slowly at first and some of the initial contacts proved dead ends. Ultimately, we were able to assemble a research team consisting of nearly a dozen Estonian researchers and practitioners. The group had close ties to the historic Tartu University and included representatives from the Cabinet Office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Estonian Television. The collaborative research effort entailed a series of meetings in Tallinn and Stockholm which discussed various theoretical, methodological, and practical issues related to crisis studies. The first collection of case studies including a preliminary comparative analysis was published in 1999 (Stern and Nohrstedt, 1999). The first research team was followed by a second, and a jointly organized international conference - including a crisis simulation inspired in part by the Estonian studies - was held in Tallinn during the fall of 2000.

Building upon the experience from the Estonian effort, similar groups have now been established in Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, Russia, Iceland, Finland, and the United States, as well as Sweden. By the end of 2000, nearly one hundred case studies drawn from the experience of more than a dozen countries and international organizations have been or are soon to be completed. In order to reach out on an even broader basis, the CM Europe Programme in collaboration with like-minded scholars and practitioners elsewhere in the region (and particularly in Holland) has helped to launch a pan-regional organization to promote crisis studies: ECMA (The European Crisis Management Academy). ECMA

held its first biannual conference in The Hague in 1999 and is currently planning its second major plenary meeting to be held in Stockholm in November 2001.

**Building Confidence & Collaborative Potential in the Region**

This was the final and most long-term goal of the CM Europe programme.  Our national and international research meetings have provided opportunities for researchers and practitioners to reflect upon their own experience and that of their neighbours.  We have already learned much about each other and a wide range of new networks have been formed.  Collaborators from countries with historic and current political problems and conflicts have had many opportunities to get to know each other and understand each other better.  As in so called track two diplomacy workshops (Kelman, 2000), CM Europe programme researchers have had the opportunity to meet in an informal and often 'off the record' fashion and exchange thoughts, methods, and experiences.  Gradually, a common view of the most important threats to the civil security of the region and elements of a common risk and crisis management vocabulary are emerging.  While it is too soon to declare that an epistemic community (Haas, 1992) has arisen, there are clear indications that convergence is taking place.  Of course, our own efforts must be placed in a much broader context of efforts by a range of regional organizations such as the EU, NATO's Partnership for Peace and EAPC, UN regional organizations, and subregional organizations such as the Council of the Baltic Sea States - with whom we have had a particularly close relationship.  Some modest progress towards this ambitious goal has been achieved, but much more remains to be done.

# Conclusion

We have suggested that despite the cultural differences between academia and policymaking, scholarship can contribute to practice under certain conditions. First, the knowledge that is to be communicated must be of a certain type. Theories based on highly abstract assumptions of rationality cannot provide much insight.  Following George (1993), we argue that scholars may contribute primarily conceptualisation of strategic problems, conditional generalizations based on empirical observation and the experience of practitioners (generic knowledge), and actor-specific behavioural models.  This is precisely what the crisis management research of the CM Europe project provides.

Second, research must be communicated in certain ways if practitioners are to listen.  Scholars must avoid unnecessary academic jargon.  They should illustrate theories by drawing on the practitioner's own experience.  In addition, a lesson learned from the CM Europe project is that working closely together with practitioners from the very early stages of a research project helps immensely in bringing about policy relevant knowledge.  If practitioners are familiarized with the research from the very beginning, their understanding of the advantages and limits of research is improved.  Thus it is more likely that they appreciate and learn from research.  In addition, by continuously drawing on the experience of practitioners, theories and methods can be improved.  Interaction between theory and practice works both ways.  This kind of communication obviously requires practical arrangements such as continuous seminars, workshops and witness symposia with participants from both academia and policymaking.

Third, the institutional setting of communicating research is pivotal for success. The CM Europe project has enjoyed an extraordinary benign institutional context,

with a dual base in the academic world and the governmental context. The development of special crisis management teaching and training programmes has provided a unique opportunity for influencing the mindsets of practitioners.

The impact of research on practice can only be limited, indirect and somewhat arbitrary. But if these three conditions are met, the chance of improving the knowledge base of policymaking is greatly enhanced.

The CM Europe project also shows that it is possible to manage many of the general problems that are associated with bridging the gap between academia and policymaking. Let us recapitulate our discussion on the 'historical', 'ideological' and 'professional' problems. The 'historical problem' of being engulfed by the current agenda is not applicable, since all case studies are carried out after the crises have ended. Current or still ongoing crises are consciously avoided. Many case studies are about crises that happened ten or twenty years ago.

The 'ideological' problem implies that the scholar working closely together with practitioners has to adhere to the major ideological premises of the latter, and even that these values are smuggled into scholarship and hidden behind a neutral, technical language. Though one can never completely abandon this problem, an important step is to be aware of it, and to articulate the premises of the research as far as possible. We acknowledge that our work not only legitimates but also explicitly intends to enrich the practice of crisis management. Indeed, this has been argued throughout this paper.

Finally, the 'professional' problem implies that the greater the involvement in policymaking, the greater the vulnerability to demands of loyalty and political correctness. To be honest, every research project that is funded by tax money is vulnerable to political trends, biases and cuts. But this problem is the same whether the publicly funded researcher isolates herself in the ivory tower or works closely together with practitioners. Indeed, by interacting with practitioners, the scholar is in a better position to influence the trends, biases and decisions by which the publicly funded researcher has to abide.

In the final analysis, researchers must ensure they are working *with* rather than *for* practitioners. The basic prerequisite is that the scholar sets the research agenda, formulates the questions, designs the methods and develops the theories. Most importantly, if the knowledge base of policy practice is to be improved, practitioners should make room for the devil's advocate. Without opening up for the unorthodox, the imaginative and the politically incorrect, policy practice soon becomes inflexible and outdated. Obviously, the policymaker does not enjoy the scholar's luxury to consider only the analytically rational but must also pay attention to the politically viable. Therefore research is best communicated through teaching and training. These are the only situations in which the scholar rather than the practitioner is in control, and in which the culture of academe rather than politics dominates.

Dr Johan Eriksson, Dr Eric K Stern & Professor Bengt Sundelius

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# The EU's Crisis Management Development from the Perspective of a Candidate Country

## Kaja Tael
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My main task is to explain to what extent a candidate country's views on crisis management coincide with the perspectives of Finland and Sweden - who are, after all, as one might say, founding fathers of the non-military crisis management concept in the EU - and where we see the main problems. Is there any difference at all between a candidate country and EU member states? Apart, of course, from the obvious fact that special consulting mechanisms are required for the candidates and that our resources are more limited.

## Estonia's View Of Crisis Management

First of all, I can certainly say that our driving force in no way differs from theirs. Isolation and neutrality have no place in the Europe of today, in the Trans-Atlantic community. Also, Estonia today is well integrated into the international community, is indeed an inseparable part of it. It is in Estonia's direct national interest to enhance the security of this international family. Therefore, Estonia is determined to participate in this common security building effort. Up till now, the most effective unions to implement this kind of international co-operation for peace and security have been the EU and NATO. No wonder that Estonia is an aspiring member of both. We see the enlargement processes of the EU and NATO as reinforcing each other, parallel and complementary. And while we participate in the constructive discussions of the emerging ESDP, Estonia stresses the importance of maintaining the Trans-Atlantic link.

This simple fact, that we strive for membership in both the EU and NATO, does make our approach somewhat different from those of Finland and Sweden. Paradoxically, it also makes life easier for us. The Estonian constitution and national security concept do not contain any legal restrictions for our country's participation in international crisis management missions, including peace imposition with military force. Therefore, we do not need to focus only on the more benign conflict resolution methods. Estonia's approach to international crisis management is based on the assumption that in the post Cold-War era crises can no longer be qualified as strictly either military or civilian in nature. Most crises that we have to manage in the future will contain both military as well as civilian aspects, and will therefore require a multi-dimensional, co-ordinated response with both military and non-military means. It is hard to perceive a crisis that could be handled only by civilian means. Even in a largely civilian operation it is sometimes necessary to use the logistical support of the military.

It has sometimes been stated that early warning, conflict prevention and post-conflict rehabilitation deserve more attention today than robust military operations. Of course, it is always better to prevent than to cure. But I am afraid that military

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operations will continue to play an important role in future crisis management. We can find plenty of examples where the international community has failed to generate the essential political will and resources to carry out conflict prevention before it was too late. During a crisis, the situation can deteriorate so quickly that we suddenly need to rely on military peace enforcement as a last resort of conflict resolution. So the military operation is just a continuation of conflict prevention by other means.

Today, when experts already talk about a "fourth generation of peace operations", having in mind coercive missions with executive functions, military and non-military aspects of crisis management are just two sides of the same coin. The almost religious efforts to draw a clear distinction between military and non-military crisis management are becoming more and more obsolete. However, Finland's and Sweden's initiative in drawing attention to the civilian aspect of crisis management has been most welcome in the EU, as reality has shown how weak the capabilities in this field actually are. Also, civilian-military co-operation and proper task-sharing between these components has become a key factor for success in modern crisis management operations. At this point, I would also like to mention the initiatives of other international organisations, such as the so-called Brahimi report (on peacekeeping) in the UN and the decisions of the OSCE Istanbul summit in 1999. The recommendations for future action have been rather similar everywhere.

## Estonia's Experience In Crisis Management

Our existing mission experiences are mostly military, as the civilian track of crisis management started somewhat later. In fact, Estonia's contribution, in terms of military peace support operations, has been significant compared to its military expenditures and the size of its defence forces. As of today, more than 500 Estonian soldiers and officers have taken part in various peacekeeping missions.

I can assure you that Estonia will pay equal attention to non-military crisis management operations. We value highly the international experience gained by our defence forces through participation in the PfP programme. We believe that the participation in civilian missions is as valuable an experience for our respective domestic structures.

On the other hand, the candidate countries themselves can surely contribute to security building by virtue of their human and material resources, geographic location, experiences and know-how. These are countries which have unique relations with their neighbours, and which possess a wide range of diplomatic contacts and useful background knowledge. Therefore, Estonia is convinced that it is necessary to draw up exact principles and modalities for the participation of the candidate countries in the EU's efforts.

Estonia's resources have been modest, but we have already had quite varied experiences with international crisis management. Since January 2000, two Estonian border-guard advisers have been participating in the OSCE mission to Georgia. Another Estonian border guard officer has been constantly involved in the WEU-led MAPE mission in Albania. An Estonian diplomat is helping to build up the independent media in Kosovo. 4 Estonian civilian police officers participate in the UNMIK mission in Kosovo. 3 Estonian senior civil servants were seconded to long-term posts in the OSCE regional missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where they acted as human rights and electoral officers. We have learned that sometimes

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it is easier for smaller countries to perform crisis management duties in a politically and emotionally sensitive environment. Nordic countries, for example, are generally considered impartial in today's conflicts. We are proud that our peacekeepers have already acquired a reputation for being calm and flexible Nordic people, who are willing to respect the local customs and to grasp the situation in its complexity.

Another example is our development co-operation. Funds have been allocated for this in the Estonian state budget since 1998. The same "small and harmless" effect is visible here, be it our civil servants' training programs for the Ukrainians, or border management know-how sharing with Georgia - the Estonian assistance has been welcomed.

## Prospects For Future Co-operation

Estonia supports the development of the European crisis management capabilities and is interested in making its contribution in this field. We look forward to the decisions to be made at the Gothenburg European Council, which will hopefully fix concrete rules and procedures for candidate countries' participation in civilian crisis management. A paper with the Presidency's proposals is currently being discussed in Brussels. And we have been promised that third countries will be briefed about the outcome of the discussions at the earliest possible opportunity.

In October 2000, Estonia presented to the EU partners its initial position paper on the civilian aspects of crisis management. We proposed the development of a unified early warning and information exchange system and the harmonising of the planning process with the action plans of crisis management, so that national crisis management systems in candidate countries would acquire a wider international dimension and interoperability with the EU member states. We were happy to see that some of our ideas were explicitly reflected in the Swedish Presidency's working programme for the EU's crisis management committee.

The first priority of the EU is civilian police. EU working groups have already developed some scenarios for police missions, so that we have a vague idea what the future tasks of the regular police force will be. An initial call for police contributions has been made among the EU members. A formal police commitment conference will take place later on in the autumn, where also third countries' participation is foreseen. Until then, we have been given some time to prepare ourselves domestically.

In order to match our resources with the requirements of the EU most efficiently, our planners need exact information about the conditions and parameters which our contribution should meet. We wish that this contribution would strengthen the EU's project, not just add ballast to it. There will definitely be some shortcomings in the EU's pool of resources, so that additional contributions from outside would be gladly received. Therefore, we need guidelines for our police, for example in the form of a matrix of competences. And these should be given to us as soon as possible, not just some weeks before the deadline for contributions.

## What We Intend To Do

First of all, effective and timely participation in various international missions, be it under the auspices of the UN, the EU, the OSCE, etc, implies creation of a central

human resources database. Here the implementation of the OSCE REACT database, established according to the decisions of the Istanbul summit, will play a crucial role. This would hopefully serve in the future as a single and comprehensive source of personnel suitable for a wide range of civilian missions, containing information about qualifications, skills, availability, training needs, etc.

We also plan to further develop the Estonian disaster relief team. This is a mobile multifunctional rescue unit established to carry out humanitarian and rescue tasks, which has various crew compositions according to the nature of the mission. The aim is to increase the total personnel of the team to 160 persons, 40 of whom would be deployable within 24 hours. The team has successfully participated in international exercises, and has received regular training in rescue techniques and emergency medicine.

Finally, we wish to enhance the training of Estonian civil servants in the field of civilian crisis management by organising seminars for senior officials and experts to introduce to them the experiences of EU member states. The problems we have to cope with domestically are familiar to many EU partners - essential resources are often scattered and scarce, the government agencies are not used to co-operating in this new field, a central co-ordinating structure is missing. Here, Estonia is definitely interested in learning even more from the experience of our Nordic neighbours - first of all Finland and Sweden - about how to meet these challenges.

## Final Remarks

Let me conclude with a quote from the lecture of President Martti Ahtisaari, given on civilian crisis management in Brussels on 4 April 2001, where we have found strong support for our endeavours.

> "The main target should be to train EU Member States' civilian crisis management resources. However, courses could be open to participants who come from associated countries … The international character of training courses … is a fundamental prerequisite for the success of the training programme and will directly improve the intercultural competence of the participants".

Also, President Ahtisaari stressed the use of information technology in crisis management as a field where the EU has the best preconditions to lead the way. Estonia, as the latest Nordic start-up in this field, hopes to prove its usefulness too.

# Turkey & The EU: Yesterday's Answers to Tomorrow's Security Problems?

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Since the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it has become rather commonplace among EU policymakers to present Turkey as a 'consumer' and not a 'producer' of security in Europe.[1]  In the absence of a Soviet threat to contain which Turkish policymakers had, in the aftermath of the Cold War, adopted the role of a 'staunch ally', Turkey's geopolitical location no longer seems to justify the kind of military as well as economic and political support it received during the Cold War. Second, the Turkish military capability, which was considered an asset at a time when NATO strategy assigned a significant deterrent value to ground forces, has lost its centrality to Western strategy.  Third, its proximity to unstable regions such as the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East means Turkey is faced with military threats and could embroil the EU in its own problems.

Given such prevalent representations of Turkey as a 'burden,' and not an 'asset' for building security in Europe, Turkish policymakers spent the 1990s trying to find Turkey a niche in the evolving post-Cold War environment.[2]  With the European Union's move to become a 'military power' in its own right, they seem to have finally found that niche.  The EU's 1999 decision to recognize Turkey as a candidate country is viewed by some as an evidence of its recognition of Turkey's value as a producer of security in Europe.[3]  It has been suggested, for instance, that an important reason behind the European Council decision to elevate Turkey's status to that of candidate country is the EU's evolving security role.  In other words, the estimates of the potential benefits of Turkey's inclusion into the EU's Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and the costs entailed by its exclusion essentially shape the EU's policies towards Turkey.[4]

The fact that the EU decision on Turkey's candidacy and the constitution of a European military force for crisis management purposes were both declared at the Helsinki summit seems to have reinforced this reasoning.  The EU's move to transform itself from a purely 'civilian power'[5] to a 'military power' has raised hopes in Turkey that the change in EU's security policies may be the opportunity Turkey has been waiting for since the end of the Cold War.

This paper aims to discuss Turkey's role in the evolving European security architecture with special reference to the debates on the recent EU move to develop military capabilities for crisis management purposes.  Towards this end, Part I of the paper will present a brief overview of the role(s) Turkey has played as a part of European security order during the Cold War.  Part II will turn to look at post-Cold War developments in Turkey-EU relations.  It will be argued that the interest both Turkey and the EU have shown in the development of a European military capability for crisis management purposes constitute yesterday's answers to tomorrow's

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problems - which are likely to be radically different from those of the past.[6] The conclusion will dwell upon the potential implications of these developments for security in Europe with special reference to the Turkish case.

## Turkey & 'Security In Europe' During The Cold War

It is indeed possible to view Turkey as having become more of a consumer and less of a producer of security in Europe depending on what is meant by 'security in Europe' - whether a military or non-military focused conception of security is adopted and how 'Europe' is defined. During the Cold War, when geopolitical imagination was centred around two alternative models of political-economic organisation - the 'East' and the 'West' - the definition of Europe was confined to the 'Free World' to which Turkey also belonged by virtue of its pro-Western orientation. The Cold War era was also characterised by the prevalence of military-focused understandings and practices of security. Turkey was viewed as a producer as well as consumer of security in Europe during this period.

Throughout the Cold War years, Turkey produced military security thanks to its strategically significant geographical location, the size of its army and the pro-Western orientation of the Turkish regime that enabled its allies to make use of NATO facilities when needed. As the Cold War waxed and waned, Turkey's value as a producer of security came to be questioned by its Western European allies whereas the strategic relationship between the United States and Turkey remained relatively stable. Notwithstanding certain periods - such as the 1970s when the US-Turkish relationship came to be labelled as a 'troubled alliance'[7] - the United States continued to view Turkey as an asset in this strategically important part of the world. On the whole, then, Turkey's geopolitical significance rendered it difficult for the United States to leave it on its own to solve its domestic economic and political problems.[8]

Turkey also consumed security as a result of the collective security guarantee provided by NATO as well as the US aid which was vitally needed for domestic and external security purposes. In one sense, this was nothing special to Turkey's case. The European Community also emerged as a consumer of security in that it benefited from a US military security guarantee as well as economic aid in the immediate post-war period. When Turkey was initially admitted to NATO, it was clear that the country was going to be a consumer of security until it gradually stabilised its domestic system to contribute fully to the production of security in Europe. However, whilst Turkey remained a consumer of security throughout the Cold War, the European Community gradually evolved into the European Union thereby becoming a producer of security (conceived broadly). In this sense, the point about Turkey having become more a consumer than producer of security in Europe has to do with not only Turkey's own dynamics (ie relative lack of progress in becoming a developed country) but also the evolution of the European Community/Union during the 1980s and 1990s.

During the Cold War, even after the Soviet Union changed its policy towards Turkey thereby ceasing the immediacy of the military threat, Turkey continued to consume security by using its relationship with the United States for regime and state security purposes. The Turkish-US alliance during this period was quite typical for a relationship between a semi-periphery country and its core ally. Turkey received produced materials (such as high-tech weaponry) as well as development aid in exchange for letting its core ally benefit from its geopolitical location (its most strategic 'primary product').

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Viewed as such, Turkey in the post-Cold War era has become a rather typical developing country that has lost some of its significance for its superpower ally now that the Cold War rivalry to win the hearts and minds of peoples in the Third World has come to an end. However, such reasoning would be faulty not only because Turkey remains a significant ally for the United States, but also because Turkey's contribution to the maintenance of security in Europe during the Cold War was not confined to the production of military security. The point here is that when security is understood in broader terms, taking into account the relationship between security policy-making and identity construction, a different picture emerges - a picture in which Turkey's contribution to the production of security in Europe becomes more apparent.

Indeed, Turkey had things other than its geographical location to contribute in helping produce security in Europe during the Cold War. Turkey served as a producer of security especially during the early years of the Cold War because it helped to secure the collective identity of the 'West' as a 'security community' and to attract other developing countries to join the 'Free World as a Western-led alliance system'.[9] Turkey's declared choice to become a 'Western' country and a member of the 'Free World' was significant for what Turkey was: a secular country with 98% Muslim population located on the periphery of 'Europe' and the 'Middle East'. Turkey's character as a country 'Western' in orientation but not in terms of its background made it a role model used by the US policymakers to encourage other non-Western countries to join the 'Free World'.

During the 1950s, Turkey embraced its role as a model to be emulated by the group of non-aligned states - at times to the dismay of US policymakers who warned their Turkish counterparts against alienating Arab countries.[10] Turkish foreign policy discourse during this period constituted Turkey as a 'secular democratic nation-state', a bulwark of the 'Free World' that was cognisant of the need to choose sides in the East-West conflict. Turkey's enthusiastic adoption of a 'Western' orientation, then, helped to produce and secure a Western identity that was rather fragile in the immediate post-war era.

Turkey's participation in the US-led effort to intervene in the conflict in Korea could be viewed as an instance of Turkey's contribution as a producer of security in both narrow and broad senses of the term. The military dimension of the Turkish contribution is rather well known and praised. However, what the US needed in Korea was not mere manpower but the constitution of an international force to signal 'Western' solidarity in the face of communist expansionism. As Jennifer Milliken has argued,

> *To answer the Soviet challenge in Korea, it was not enough for US policymakers that the United States alone intervene. The test to UN collective security promises - and the charges of US imperialism - required that the intervention be backed by UN decree and involve Western and Free World states.*[11]

Turkish policymakers accepted outright the US representation of the need for the constitution of a multilateral force for intervention.[12] They were interested in proving the United States that they were 'reliable' allies who were ready to commit troops where and when needed. This was not only because US policymakers viewed their European allies as rather 'fragile and uncertain' and therefore not too 'dependable', but also because Turkey's so-called 'active neutrality' during the Second World War was not appreciated by its allies (Britain in particular) and had caused it to be

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represented as an 'uncertain' ally with a tendency to appease.[13]   Turkey's enthusiastic participation in the Korean intervention could therefore be viewed as intended by Turkish policymakers to represent Turkey as a 'dependable' ally and a crucial part of the US-led collective security effort.  The ultimate aim was to bolster Turkey's chances of being accepted as a NATO member.[14]

To summarise, although it is possible to view Turkey as having been more of a consumer than a producer of security during the Cold War, when security is viewed in broader terms taking into account its non-military dimensions (and in particular the relationship between security policy-making and identity construction) Turkey did play a significant role as a producer of security in Europe.  Admittedly, this role was more crucial in the early years of the Cold War, especially during the 1950s and 1960s compared to later years when the character of the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States on the one hand, and with Western Europe on the other hand, began to change.  The point here is that it is significant to understand fully the nature of Turkey's contribution to the maintenance of security in Europe during the Cold War, for this would help policymakers on both sides to shape the future of Turkey-EU relations as well as security in Europe.

## Turkey & 'Security In Europe' In The Post-Cold War Era

The end of the Cold War brought out into the open the already existing gap between US and EU perceptions of Turkey's contribution to security–building in Europe.  The United States is a superpower with a global vision and has continued, even in the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, to give importance to Turkey as a significant asset in projecting military power.  The Gulf War (1990-1991) served to reinforce US perception of Turkey as a core ally in this strategically important part of the world.

The same war highlighted the divisions inside the European Union regarding not only Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) but also Turkey's (post-Cold War) value in the eyes of EU policymakers.  Turkey's request for the deployment of Allied Mobile Force (AMF) in December 1990 caused an internal debate in Germany as to whether Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty should be invoked or not.  Eventually AMF was deployed in Turkey in early 1991.  But the fact that putting Article V into practice did not turn out to be a 'smooth and automatic' process led some Turkish policymakers to perceive this hesitance as indicative of the EU's perception of Turkey as a 'burden' and not an 'asset' for building security in Europe.[15]  As suggested in the introduction, such perceptions still prevail; Turkey's military security concerns continue to colour Turkey's relations with the European Union.  Note, for instance, the following words by a Turkish foreign ministry official:

> *Some European countries, in search of an excuse for their refusal to agree on satisfactory and inclusive arrangements for Turkey's participation in military and non-military crisis management operations, assert that the contribution of Turkey to such operations would be welcomed.  Seen from a Turkish perspective, such an attitude amounts to confining Turkey's contribution to that of a sub-contractor.[16]*

Turkey evidently has legitimate security concerns that should be taken into consideration by its EU counterparts when shaping the institutions that will undertake military crisis management operations.[17]  However, a more constructive approach - more constructive than criticising the EU for 'excluding Turkey from

European crisis management'[18] - would have been to seek new ways of reinstating Turkey's value for building security in Europe. Arguably, this could take the form of more stress being put on non-military tools of security policy making, such as 'second-track diplomacy', 'international mediation', 'preventive diplomacy' and 'conflict resolution.[19] Such an approach that is cognisant of the non-military dimensions of security could also strengthen Turkey's status as an EU candidate.

Such a constructive approach by Turkish policymakers is needed because, in the midst of the current debate on ESDP and the development of a European military capability for crisis management purposes, it is easily forgotten that the EU also practices 'soft governance' by putting stress on the non-military dimensions and practices of security. This is why during the 1990s it has become increasingly difficult to present Turkey as an 'asset' to this 'civilian power' EU. The reasons are twofold. First, the EU does not need the kind of military security Turkey knows how to produce - or at least it did not, until very recently. Second, Turkey has failed to become a producer of economic and political security as a result of various stalls in the democratization process and its underdeveloped economy that has caused some of Turkey's problems (such as the Kurdish issue) to become European problems. This is why some EU policymakers think that Turkey produces 'insecurity' by exporting its domestic problems via the Turkish diaspora in Western Europe.

An important evidence for EU policymakers' view of Turkey as a 'burden' rather than a strategic 'asset' could be found in their rejection of Turkish application for membership in 1989 and the 1997 decision to leave Turkey out of *Agenda 2000*. However, with the 1999 Helsinki Summit decision to recognise Turkey's candidate status, the EU's approach to Turkey took a different turn. As noted in the introduction, some in Turkey view this change as driven by the EU's interest in giving a military backbone to its crisis management capability. It is argued, for instance, that 'as the European Union is increasingly involved in the broader security issues of Europe together with NATO, it will be more difficult to overlook Turkey's role in the security field' (understood in narrow military terms) and it was based on this understanding that there has evolved 'a more inclusive attitude towards Turkey'.[20] Accordingly, it is suggested that the EU's growing interest in the constitution of a European military crisis management capability has created an opportunity for Turkey to prove itself useful as a producer of security in Europe. The argument of this paper is that both the EU's move to become a 'military power' and Turkey's attempt to strengthen its candidacy by stressing its military capability, constitute yesterday's answers to tomorrow's security problems.

### *Why would focusing on the development of a military crisis management capability constitute 'yesterday's answer' for the European Union?*

'Yesterday's answer' could be defined as military-focused understandings and practices of security - the kind of practices the EU until very recently, did not have to adopt thanks to the military guarantee provided by NATO under US leadership. The European Union's move to become a 'military power' constitutes yesterday's answer in the sense that the Cold War success of the EU in building security in Europe was rooted in its management of the non-military dimensions of security. As Bill McSweeney has maintained, the project of European integration has, from its very inception, been a 'security policy in response to a non-specific and non-military security problem'.[21] In this sense, the European Union itself is the best evidence in support of the argument for the need to use non-military means to solve security problems.

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Over the years, the EU has developed its 'edge' in practising 'soft governance' and adopting a comprehensive approach to security. As Adrian Hyde-Price has argued, EU policymakers have resisted the temptation to simplify complex conflicts into 'good guys' and 'bad guys,' therefore becoming better able to develop a more comprehensive understanding of security than USA. The EU is thus well placed to address many of the broader, non-military dimensions of security, which figure so prominently on the contemporary European security agenda.[22]

Indeed, the kinds of problems the EU is likely to face in the future are likely to be problems that have socio-economic and environmental roots. In this sense, a case could be made for the EU to concentrate on its strengths and focus on the use of non-military instruments as it has done in the past in approaching its domestic as well as external security problems. The EU's security relations with its southern periphery (see below) are a good example for the latter.

Admittedly, the case for addressing the problem of the EU's inability to back its economic and political power with the military means 'now rather than later' is strong. The Kosovo air war brought out into the open the need for the EU to become more effective in military crisis management 'in and around Europe'. It could also plausibly be argued that 'the risk that a new European military force might undermine NATO is less than the threat posed by the status quo.'[23] However, what is often forgotten is that although the risk of undermining NATO could be one worth taking, the repercussions the development of a European military force are likely to cause in its relations with the southern periphery should lead EU policymakers to re-think their policies. For it was the EU's character as a 'civilian power' that gave it an edge in building security in the Mediterranean - the reason why it was able to bring together the policymakers of countries such as Syria and Israel under the roof of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership scheme. If the EU moves to become a 'military power' in its own right, it is likely to lose this edge.

Indeed, even before the Helsinki 1999 decision was taken, the kind of discourse that was employed when discussing the need for developing military crisis management capabilities (in particular EU policymakers' adoption of different discourses when talking about the eastern and the southern peripheries) had already begun to alienate EU's southern neighbours. The fact that the need for the constitution of a European military force is justified with reference to security threats stemming from instability in the south, in the eyes of some Mediterranean policymakers, seems to have begun to blur the distinction between 'military power' NATO and 'civilian power' EU.[24] Also, it could not have escaped Arab policymakers that Britain, which has been acting together with the United States in the recent bombings of Iraq, is also one of the major proponents of the development of a European military capability. When the Helsinki decision is interpreted within the context provided by the aforementioned change in the EU security discourse, it becomes relatively easier to understand Libyan President Qaddafi's 1996 statement that 'the establishment of EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR is a declaration of war on Arab states.'[25] While Qaddafi's statement is clearly an exaggerated response, it is indicative of growing resentment in the south against the EU's differentiated approach to security in its peripheries. This last point begs further elaboration.

In the post-Cold War era, the European Union has embarked upon a two-fold strategy to enhance security in Europe.[26] The first part of this strategy has been that of deepening the relations among its existing members whilst expanding to the East. EU expansion entails the export of the EU's own security-building model to former Warsaw Pact members as well as Malta and Cyprus (and Turkey since December

1999).  In other words, the project of EU expansion is a non-military security policy adopted to maintain 'security in Europe'.

The second part of the EU strategy (which will be analysed in more detail) has been the setting up of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) in an attempt to encourage inter-state cooperation and increase regional interdependence as a way of maintaining stability in the Mediterranean - the southern periphery.  The EMP is the latest in a series of attempts made by the EC/EU since the 1970s to increase dialogue with Middle Eastern countries (especially those in the geographically closer North Africa).[27]  The Gulf War of 1990-1991 only helped to reinforce the already existing view among EU policymakers that 'regional economic solidarity among the peoples of the region' is a 'cornerstone for peace, stability, and development in the Middle East,' which, in turn, is viewed as a necessary component of 'security in Europe'.[28]

The EMP scheme took shape at the Barcelona conference (November 25-26 1995) with the participation of Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, the Palestinian Authority, Tunisia and Turkey.  At the end of the conference, the Barcelona Declaration was signed to establish a partnership in three core areas: political and security relations, economic and financial relations, and social, cultural and human relations.  The cornerstone of the EMP is viewed as the creation of a free-trade zone in industrial goods and services over a 12-year period. The idea behind this formulation is stated as not only one of creating an expanded trading bloc, but also to provide incentives for sound economic and financial decision-making by Middle Eastern participants, to create a framework for labour-intensive European-funded development projects, and even to reduce intra-Middle Eastern conflicts by providing a non-threatening forum for participation across divides.'[29]

Thus, the European Union's approach to security on its southern periphery is non-military in the sense that it has sought to contribute to building security in the Mediterranean through the use of various non-military instruments.  The EU has so far almost single-handedly (with some backing from Egypt) shaped the Mediterranean as a region to meet its own security interests.[30]

The EU's security policies towards the Mediterranean have been shaped around three major concerns: energy security (understood as the sustained flow of oil and natural gas at reasonable prices), regional stability (especially in the geographically closer North Africa) and the cessation of conflict in Israel/Palestine.  In the 1980s, changes in the societies of EU member states as a result of the growth of the North African diaspora in Western Europe led EU policymakers to re-think their priorities and come to consider stability in the Mediterranean as an integral part of 'security in Europe'. The shift in the EU's priorities towards the Mediterranean (rather than other parts of the 'Middle East' which the United States has traditionally been more interested in) should be understood within the context created, over the years, by the convergence of domestic societal as well as economic concerns.  The presence of a large and growing North African diaspora in Western Europe has meant that the de-stabilization of Mediterranean societies could be detrimental to security and stability in the European Union.  In short, the EU's turn towards a more Mediterranean-centred approach has its roots in the domestic societal concerns of EU member states and a re-thinking of security in the EU against the backdrop of migration from North Africa, the increasing restlessness within the North African diaspora in the European Union and the civil war in Algeria that has accelerated these two processes.

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In line with the EU policymakers' conviction that the threat and use of force as an instrument of security policy would not solve those problems that are non-military in character, the EU, throughout the 1990s, emphasised democratisation and economic development as the means to establish security in the Mediterranean.[31]  However, notwithstanding such high expectations, the EMP has so far not made any significant impact largely due to the momentum created by the Middle East Peace Process (and lately the difficulties it has run into).  Still, the Euro-Mediterranean partnership is considered to be the institution best equipped to develop a regional security regime for the Mediterranean: not only does it bring together more regional countries than any of the other initiatives, but, more importantly, it is the only forum in which the security needs of [non-European Mediterranean countries] are approached comprehensively through economic, political and security cooperation.[32]

Indeed, between 1995-2000, substantial progress has been achieved in negotiation and signature of association agreements, and EU funding has been mobilised for the region under the MEDA programme, the most important financial tool of the Barcelona Process.[33]

One major problem with the EMP is that it is a non-military security policy adopted by the EU to serve its own security needs and interests.  In other words, the referent for the EU's Mediterranean security discourse is the EU itself.  Southern Mediterranean states, on their part, have participated in these schemes largely in return for EU economic and technical/technological support, which they hope to use for domestic and regime security purposes.  The point here is that it would be difficult for the EMP to contribute to building security in the Mediterranean until an attempt is made to bridge the gap between the security needs and interests as well as expectations of the EU and non-EU members of the EMP.

On the other hand, it should be emphasised that the EU, true to its form as a 'civilian power', has proven itself to be the best-endowed and most competent actor in conducting people-to-people diplomacy; this, in turn, has bolstered its position vis-à-vis a significant portion of NGOs in the Arab world (especially in north Africa) and helped to strengthen Mediterranean regionalism.[34]  The EU has also made a significant contribution to the Middle East Peace Process by providing funding to the Palestinian National Authority in the hope that building the economy and civil society would strengthen the hand of the Palestinian side at the negotiation table.  By this way, the EU has shown interest in playing the role of a 'cosmopolitan mediator' that seeks to redress the imbalance between the disputing parties rather than perpetuating it.  Indeed, as Deiniol Jones has argued, the EU is in a unique position to stress the need for 'cosmopolitan mediation' as an alternative to the power politics or facilitative approaches to mediation that currently prevail in world politics.[35]  To reiterate, what has so far enabled the EU to have an edge in building security through 'soft governance' was not merely its socio-economic power but also the fact that it was not a 'military power'.  Greater stress on the development of a European military capability for crisis management purposes, on the other hand, might cause the EU to lose this edge.

### *Why would Turkey's stress on contributing to an emerging European military crisis management capability constitute 'yesterday's answer'?*

The enthusiasm Turkish policymakers have shown in contributing to EU efforts in the development of a military crisis management capability constitutes 'yesterday's answer' because, by way of trying to strengthen Turkey's profile in Europe through stressing its geographical position and military capability, Turkish policymakers are

drawing lessons from the Cold War past - in particular the process through which Turkey became a NATO member. In doing this, they are operating with a military-focused conception of security. Accordingly, they view Turkey's military capability and geopolitical location as the most significant assets that helped the country to join NATO. Building upon such reasoning they seem to think that as the EU is becoming more interested in the military dimension of security, Turkey's relations with the EU would improve.

It is true that Turkey's contribution to EU military crisis management efforts would be significant. Furthermore, Turkey's potential contribution to the constitution of a European military force seems to have strengthened its standing vis-à-vis the other candidates. A European Union which is interested in developing its own military crisis management capability would need Turkey because Turkey has become a large, effective and modern military power both in its own region and in NATO. Furthermore, it has a well-trained army experienced in low-intensity warfare. This factor is particularly important for contributing to Petersberg type operations.

Turkey's geographical location is adjacent to regions of critical importance to the EU's interests. Turkey's location, NATO-class military infrastructure and logistical means constitute an indispensable environment for EU military power projection.[36] Given the difficulties the EU is likely to encounter when projecting and sustaining military power outside EU territory,[37] Turkey's military capabilities as well as geographical position would become significant assets.[38] However, should Turkish policymakers try to take a 'short-cut' to EU membership by relying on emphasising Turkey's potential contribution to the production of military security, this is unlikely to be to the country's benefit in the long term. For, as noted above, the main reason why the EU policymakers view Turkey as a consumer of security is because it has failed to learn how to produce the kind of security the project of European integration has thrived upon. An attempt to play the 'military card' is unlikely to reinforce Turkey's candidacy in the long run if it continues to lag behind in the production of non-military security whilst producing 'insecurity' by exporting some of its domestic problems through the Turkish diaspora in Western Europe.

To summarise, the context in which Turkey became a NATO member is significantly different from the environment that Turkey today finds itself in. Hence the need to be cautious when drawing lessons from past experience. Having said that, it is also important for Turkish policymakers to make sure that the factors that enabled Turkey's NATO membership are well understood. As suggested above, a different lesson that could be drawn from Turkey's Cold War past - a lesson Turkish policymakers seem to remain oblivious to - could be found in the way that Turkey helped to secure the 'Western' identity through its security policies. The point here is that Turkish policymakers could choose to present Turkey as an asset in the EU's relations with its southern periphery. For, if it was Turkey's contribution to the constitution and securing of a 'Western' identity that enabled its membership of an institution to which it was initially considered as an unlikely member (ie NATO), Turkish policymakers would do well to try and find Turkey a similar edge in strengthening their profile vis-à-vis the European Union - that is, by stressing the role Turkey could play in constituting a multi-cultural 'European' identity that is not anti-Muslim. If such a move could be coupled by stress being put on the use of non-military tools of security policy-making[39] Turkey would become able to generate answers for tomorrow's security problems.

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# Conclusion

It is indeed possible that EU and Turkish policymakers may succeed in constructing a truly multi-cultural 'European' identity by re-imagining the contours of the 'European civilisation', which, in turn, may help the EU to alleviate the worries of its southern neighbours. For the reasons why the non-EU Mediterranean countries have recently begun to show uneasiness towards EU's security policies are rooted in the differences between the approaches adopted by the EU towards its eastern and southern neighbours. Arguably, this difference indicates a shift from the discourse of 'ideological geopolitics' to 'civilisational geopolitics' through the adoption of which EU policymakers have sought to build a 'European' identity through security policy-making.

'Civilisational geopolitics' was the prevalent discourse when 'Europe' was first invented as a 'continent'. Ancient Greek mariners identified three continents: Europe, Asia and Libya (Africa). The lands on either side of the Aegean Sea, which was at the heart of the Greek conception of the globe, were given the names 'Europe' and 'Asia'. 'Libya' denoted the lands to the south of the Aegean Sea.[40] As geographical knowledge accumulated and the authority of Greek mariners decreased, the absence of a clear demarcation line dividing 'Europe' and 'Asia' - such as the Red Sea that divides 'Asia' and 'Africa' - was pointed to by scholars to question the status of 'Europe' as a continent given the fact that it was not a 'discernible landmass'. 'Europe' nevertheless became a continent in the mental maps of 'Europeans' who, 'by positing a continental division between Europe and Asia … were able to reinforce the notion of a cultural dichotomy between these two areas - a dichotomy that was essential to modern Europe's identity as a civilisation'.[41]

The difference between the EU's approaches to its eastern and southern periphery could indeed be viewed as indicative of a return to 'civilisational geopolitics' in an attempt to secure a 'European' identity. In the EU discourse the Eastern European countries are presented as 'returning to Europe'[42] whereas questions are increasingly being asked as to whether Turkey 'belongs' to Europe. This difference in discourse, when coupled with the European Union's mid-1990s attempt to move relations with Turkey from the basket of security in Europe into that of the Mediterranean has caused some in Turkey to wonder whether in the minds of EU policymakers the contours of Europe are being drawn along civilisational lines.[43] It is plausible that Turkey may be destined to contribute to the making of a 'European' identity by serving as the 'other' against which Europe's identity will be reinscribed through security policy-making. After all, the 'Turk' served as one of the 'others' of Europe throughout history.[44] If this were to become the case, it would have implications for the EU's relations with its southern periphery.

An alternative scenario suggests that Turkey becoming an EU member may enable the Union to present itself to its southern periphery as a truly multi-cultural entity that is not anti-Muslim. However, given Turkey's background as the inheritor of the Ottoman Empire and its unwillingness to get involved in Middle Eastern affairs during most of the republican era, it is not clear what shape Turkey's contribution may take. A Turkey that is keen on stressing its military crisis management capability is unlikely to be helpful in alleviating the fears of the southern neighbours. Furthermore, Turkish policymakers have so far proven hesitant to participate fully in the EMP.[45] Claiming that Turkey is not just another Mediterranean country, Turkish policymakers made clear their resentment towards their EU counterparts' approach to Turkey within the EMP framework. Following the 1999 decision of the EU, this resentful attitude could be expected to change. However, given the non-EU

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Mediterranean countries' primary interest, the development of bilateral relations with the European Union, it is questionable to what extent Turkey can contribute to the EMP unless it reconstructs itself as an actor competent in using non-military tools of security policy-making.

Turkish policymakers have so far proven themselves uninterested in the non-military dimensions of security. During the 1990s, Turkey not only failed to adopt broad conceptions of security, but it also experienced a securitisation of its foreign policy whereby certain issues were pulled out of the realm of open debate and discussion by way of declaring them 'national security' issues.[46] The debate on Turkey's potential contribution is conducted in such an environment shaped by the prevalence of military-focused understandings of security and security policy-making. Hence Turkish policymakers' welcoming attitude to the development of a European military capability for crisis management purposes. Indeed, the EU decision is considered by Turkish policymakers as indicative of the EU finally becoming a "normal" power as opposed to merely "civilian" power'.[47] It comes across as somewhat paradoxical that Turkey is playing the 'military security card' to join an institution that has proved itself a success story in building security through the use of non-military instruments. It is no less paradoxical than the EU aspiration to become a 'military power' after having proven itself a success story as a 'civilian power' that managed to build 'security in Europe' through the use of non-military instruments.

## Endnotes

1    'Turkey is not producing the [sic] security but rather consuming security and producing insecurity,' German minister Hans-Ulrich Klose is reported to have said at a conference organized by the Körber Foundation in İstanbul in 1997. See Hüseyin Bağcı, 'Changing Security Perspective of Turkey,' in Turkey at the Threshold of the 21st Century: Global Encounters and/vs Regional Alternatives, Mustafa Aydın, ed (Ankara: International Relations Foundation, 1998), p81.

2    See Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer, 'Turkey and the European Idea,' NATO's Sixteen Nations 4 (1993), p82-87, for a succinct analysis of post-Cold War soul-searching among Turkish policymakers.

3    This is not to deny the disagreements among the members of the European Union regarding Turkey's value for security-building in Europe. On the differences within the EU regarding Turkish membership, see Pia Christina Wood, 'Europe and Turkey: A Relationship Under Fire,' Mediterranean Quarterly (Winter 1999), p95-115.

4    Meltem Müftüler-Baç, 'Turkey's Role in the EU's Security and Foreign Policies,' Security Dialogue 31:4 (2000), p489. Also see Atila Eralp, 'Turkey in the Enlargement Process: From Luxembourg to Helsinki,' Perceptions (June-August 2000), p17-32; Ali L Karaosmanoğlu, 'Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Kimliği Açısından Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri,' (Turkey-European Union Relations From the Perspective of European Security and Defence Identity) Doğu Batı, No 14 (2001), p156-166.

5    On 'civilian power' EU, see Karen E Smith, 'The End of Civilian Power EU: A Welcome Demise or Cause for Concern?' The International Spectator, XXXV:2 (2000), p11-28.

6    Michael T Klare, 'The Era of Multiplying Schisms: World Security in the Twenty-first Century,' in World Security: Challenges for a New Century, Michael T Klare & Yogesh Chandrani, eds (New York: St Martin's Press, 1998), p59-77.

7    George S Harris, Troubled Alliance (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1972).

8    On Turkey's security policies during the Cold War, see Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer, 'Turkey's Security Policies,' Adelphi Papers, No 164 (1981), especially p14-39.

9    Jennifer Milliken, 'Intervention and Identity: Reconstructing the West in Korea,' in Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities and the Production of Danger, Jutta Weldes,

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[10]    George Crews McGhee, The US-Turkish-NATO Middle Eastern Connection (New York: St Martin's Pres, 1990).

[11]    Milliken, 'Intervention and Identity', p104.

[12]    Nuri Eren, Turkey Today - And Tomorrow (London: Pall Mall Press, 1963), p226-228.

[13]    Selim Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War: An Active Neutrality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

[14]    Selim Deringil, 'Turkish Foreign Policy Since Atatürk,' in Turkish Foreign Policy: New Prospects (Cambridgeshire: The Eothen Press, 1992), p3-4.

[15]    On the EU debates on CFSP and the deployment of AMF, see Gülnur Aybet, A European Security Architecture After the Cold War: Questions of Legitimacy (London: Macmillan, 2000), p102-114.

[16]    Ömür Orhun, 'European Security and Defence Identity - Common European Security and Defence Policy: A Turkish Perspective,' Perceptions, (September November 2000), p15-124.

[17]    On Turkey's security concerns regarding ESDP, see Gülnur Aybet, 'NATO's Developing Role in Collective Security,' SAM Papers, No 4 (1999), p56-57.

[18]    Orhun, 'European Security and Defence Identity', p124.

[19]    Nimet Beriker-Atiyas, 'Yeni Dünya Eski Yaklaşımlar,' Foreign Policy (Turkish Edition) (January-February 2001), p41-54.

[20]    Eralp, 'Turkey in the Enlargement Process', p28, 31.

[21]    Bill McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p8.

[22]    Adrian Hyde-Price, 'The Antinomies of European Security: Dual Enlargement and the Reshaping of European Order,' Contemporary Security Policy, 21:3 (2000), p157.

[23]    Peter Van Ham, 'Europe's Common Defense Policy: Implications for the Trans-Atlantic Relationship,' Security Dialogue, 31:2 (2000), p222.

[24]    Laura Guazzone, 'Who Needs Conflict Prevention in the Mediterranean?' The International Spectator, XXXV:1 (2000), p88.

[25]    Quoted in Guazzone, 'Who Needs Conflict Prevention in the Mediterranean?' 88. Libya is the only north African country that has remained outside the EMP.

[26]    The recent EU endeavour to create a 'Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe' is beyond the confines of this study. See Bodo Hombach, 'Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe: A New Perspective for the Region', Perceptions, 3, (September-November 2000), p5-21.

[27]    Haifaa Jawad, The Euro-Arab Dialogue: A Study in Collective Diplomacy (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1992); Gerd Nonneman, ed, The Middle East and Europe: An Integrated Communities Approach (London: Federal Trust for Education and Research, 1992).

[28]    Gary Miller, 'An Integrated Communities Approach', in The Middle East and Europe, Nonneman ed, p13.

[29]    Robert Satloff, 'America, Europe and the Middle East in the 1990s: Interests and Policies,' in Allies Divided: Transatlantic Policies for the Greater Middle East, Robert D Blackwill and Michael Stürmer, eds, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), p23.

[30]    On the EU's invention of 'Mediterranean regionalism,' see Pinar Bilgin, 'Whose Middle East? Geopolitical Inventions and Practices of Security,' in Security, Community and Emancipation: Critical Security Studies in Global Politics, Ken Booth, ed, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, forthcoming).

[31]    François Heisbourg, 'The United States, Europe and Military Force Projection,' in Allies Divided, Blackwill & Stürmer, eds, p284-285. On the issue of security in the Gulf, however, EU policymakers followed the US lead and did not rule out the threat and use of force as an instrument of foreign and security policy as was the case with the Gulf war and recent

bombings of Iraq. Although the EU remains divided on the later issue, EU policymakers to a large extent share US conceptions of security in the Gulf, which prioritises military stability over democratisation and development.

[32] Guazzone, 'Who Needs Conflict Prevention in the Middle East?', p100.

[33] Under MEDA I, the EU has allocated in the form of grants nearly EUR 1 billion per year. In addition, the European Investment Bank provides complementary financial support in the form of repayable loans. Under MEDA II, EUR 5,350 billion is reserved for the Mediterranean partners of the EMP. See The Barcelona Process, Five Years On: 1995-2000 (Luxembourg: Office For Official Publications of the European Communities, 2000).

[34] This achievement has partly to do with the economic as well as technical assistance the EU has provided to Middle Eastern NGOs. Between 1995-99, the EU set aside $5.528 billion to be granted to regional NGOs. See 'European Union Funding for the Middle East NGOs,' Bulletin of Regional Cooperation in the Middle East, 7:4, (Winter 1998/99), p15.

[35] Deiniol Jones, Cosmopolitan Mediation? Conflict Resolution and the Oslo Accords (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999).

[36] Karaosmanoğlu, 'Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Kimliği Açısından Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri', (Turkey-EU Relations from the Perspective of ESDI), p161.

[37] Alistair J K Shephard, 'Top-Down or Bottom-Up: Is Security and Defence Policy in the EU a question of Political Will or Military Capability?', European Security, 9:2 (2000), p13-30.

[38] It is worth noting here that Turkey, like some EU members, has a conscript military. Although the Turkish military is experienced in low-intensity warfare and has proven itself valuable in post-Cold War peacekeeping operations, for Turkey to develop an 'edge' over other EU candidates, its military would need to be trained for crisis management or peacemaking operations in 'foreign' locations. Nevertheless, considering the fact that many of the EU's crisis hotspots are located around Turkey's borders, Turkish forces would be operating in venues less 'foreign' to them than to their EU counterparts.

[39] Beriker-Atiyas, 'Yeni Dünya Eski Yaklaşımlar', p46-54.

[40] Martin W Lewis & Kären E Wigen, The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), p21-22.

[41] Lewis & Wigen, The Myth of Continents, p36.

[42] John Baylis, 'European Security Between the "Logic of Anarchy" and the "Logic of Community,"' in Redefining European Security, Carl C Hodge, ed, (New York: Garland Publishing Inc, 1999), p19; Hyde-Price, 'The Antinomies of European Security', p149.

[43] A second question that also begs for an answer is whether they view the borders of European civilisation as stable as Samuel Huntington presents them to be. See Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order (London: Touchstone, 1998).

[44] Iver B Neumann, Uses of the Other: The 'East' in European Identity Formation (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), p39-63.

[45] They have been more enthusiastic participants in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organisation (BSEC), which they themselves helped found. Nevertheless, time has proven that both the EMP and BSEC are viewed by Turkish policymakers as assets that could substantiate Turkey's EU candidacy. For a comparative analysis of Turkey's approach to the EMP and BSEC, see Fatih Tayfur, 'Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation: A Comparative Analysis,' in Dış Politika - Foreign Policy, 1-2-3-4, (1999), p75-100.

[46] Gencer Özcan, 'Doksanlarda Türkiye'nin Ulusal Güvenlik ve Dış Politikasında Askeri Yapının Artan Etkisi,' (The Increasing Influence of the Military Structure on Turkey's National Security and Foreign Policy during the Nineties) in En Uzun Onyıl: Türkiye'nin Ulusal Güvenlik ve Dış Politika Gündeminde Doksanlı Yıllar (The Longest Decade: Turkey's National Security and Foreign Policy Agenda During the Nineties) (İstanbul: Boyut, 1998), p67-100.

[47] Orhun, 'European Security and Defence Identity', p118.

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Turkey & The EU: Yesterday's Answers to Tomorrow's Security Problems?

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# The EU's Crisis Management From The Russian Perspective

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Non-military mechanisms of conflict prevention are the main priority of Russia in the security sphere. The Russian Federation since the beginning of its post-Soviet history has acquired significant experience of intervention (directly or indirectly) into ethnic conflicts in different parts of the former USSR. Since 1992 Russia has lost more than 150 peace-keepers in different parts of the former USSR and other countries of the world. Experts should evaluate the effectiveness of Russian interventions in conflicts in South Osetia, Abhazia, Nagornyy Karabakh, Transnistria, as well as into the civil war in Tajikistan, where about 150 Russian peace-keepers were killed. It is too early yet to say that all the conflicts are over, but it can be argued that all these conflicts are to some extent manageable and conflicting sides are now more likely to meet each other over the negotiating table. Russia has to play an important role in regional peace-keeping if it wants to fulfil its intention to play a significant role in European and world politics. Peace-keeping operations help Russia demonstrate political and military power in the post-Soviet space.

In contrast to the experience of the CIS, the border between Russia and the European Union is the most tranquil interstate border of the Russian Federation. For many years Russia has experienced no threat from the opposite side of this border. Moreover, the European Union member-states are the most important partners of Russia in international economic relations. President Vladimir Putin has several times confirmed the special status of partnership with the EU and Russia's intention to be part of European politics and economy. In his view, expressed at the Annual Address to the Federal Council of Russia (3 April 2001), 'The direction towards integration with Europe is becoming one of the major directions of our foreign policy'. Such explicit and concrete statements were never uttered by Russian leaders on this issue before Putin became President.

It is characteristic that in practice all official statements about Russia's attitude to military co-operation of the EU countries have been made not by the minister of foreign affairs or the minister of defence of Russia. They have been made by the former secretary of the Security Council of Russian Federation Sergey Ivanov, who in April 2001 was appointed minister of defence. He mentioned several times that the European Foreign and Security Policy is an issue of special concern to Russia due to its possibility to improve security in the continent in general. Critics of Russian foreign policy, reacting to this generally positive Russian position, often speak about its real essence - wait and see politics. To some extent I do agree with that position, but with one comment. For Russia, as well as several other leading nations in the world, it is not clear if the EU has enough political will to follow this path to its logical end - the total responsibility of Europeans for security in the continent.

NATO's eastward enlargement to the Baltic states is continuing to be a very important issue for Russian foreign policy, even more important than issues of the architecture of European security, with its growing role for the European Union. First of all - Russia is not totally sure that there is 100% guarantee that "Baltic" enlargement will take place in reality in 2002. There are arguments against the enlargement not only from the Russian side, but from some other countries which are members of both NATO and the EU. An important argument for Russia's final acceptance of the enlargement is the thesis that Russia has to be swayed by its economic interests. The access of its national resources to markets of countries which are NATO members, will in the final stage of discussion allow economic arguments to prevail over all others. We think that in practice Russia's dependence on European markets is not so obvious. A major share of the currency inflow to Russia from European markets is related to the export of energy. Oil, which is one of the key Russian export goods, is traded on exchanges, and so fears that NATO countries will be able to organize a boycott of Russian oil exports appears highly unlikely - particularly as the UN would never support the boycott.

The situation with Russian natural gas is totally different - Russia is dependent on Europe in this issue. But even here there is not much choice for both sides: Russia trades natural gas at world market prices via an existing system of pipe-lines. A decision by Europe to replace Russian natural gas with gas from Norway or Algeria would be a very costly one and in opposition to the current tendency of the EU to develop dialogue with the Russia energy sector. Thus it is too early to discuss the real interdependence of Russia and Europe. We have to create this interdependence, and such problems as NATO enlargement to the Baltic states or the military operation in Kosovo and lack of will to defend Macedonia make the task more complicated.

Moreover, the issue of the membership of Baltic states in NATO may complicate international relations in the Baltic Rim. As we know, at the moment Denmark is an active proponent of enlargement to all three Baltic states, but Finland and Sweden are trying to distance themselves from the problem, simultaneously convincing the leadership of Latvia and Estonia of the importance of developing better relations with Russia. Russia is actively supporting this tendency. For Moscow, it is an objective and very positive tendency that Northern and Western Europe do not perceive it as a source of military threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of three Baltic states. For this reason regular statements by Estonian leaders (chief of Estonian Defence Forces Admiral Tarmo Kouts and Vice-Chancellor of the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Harri Tiido for example), on the opportunity to deploy on its territory nuclear weapons after becoming a member of NATO, are perceived in Moscow as a provocation, aimed at a further deterioration of already very cool bilateral relations.

NATO enlargement to the Baltic states will force Russia to undertake reactive measures, which from a military and political point of view affect the whole Northern European region. The strategic purpose of Russia in several regions of the world, and particularly in Northern Europe, has remained the same over the last ten years. Russia aims to secure the status quo that existed at the moment of collapse of the USSR in the form of a balance of power between the West and the East within the very important European region. NATO enlargement will totally destroy the balance, which was very favourable for Moscow. There are enough serious and unsolved problems in the Baltic region from the Russian point of view (securing Russian economic interests in the region and the Russian-speaking minority are the most important), and so Russia's interest in the Baltic Rim is

permanent.  As the best scenario, NATO membership of the Baltic states will freeze the current positive dynamics in Russian-Latvian and Russian-Estonian relations, as well as the development of links between Russian regions in the Northwest and Estonia.  Russia will have to revise the priorities of its transport politics, which allow private companies to export goods through sea ports in Leningrad and Murmansk region.  The optimum scenario for Russia is delay or total rejection of the idea of NATO enlargement to the Baltic states.  It will allow Russia and European nations to come back to Russia's idea of 1997 on joint security guarantees to three Baltic states.

Russian media and politicians evaluate the situation in Macedonia in March-April 2001 as a tremendous failure of NATO, as NATO's disgrace, whose effect will change European security politics in the near future.  In fact, NATO was not able to fulfil its obligations towards Macedonia.  This country was a loyal partner of the alliance during the operation in Kosovo, and the hope of its leadership was that NATO would protect its territorial integrity and internal stability in the future.  The developments in both Kosovo and Macedonia show that NATO is ready to kill for peace and security in Europe, but NATO is not able to send troops to die for the same peace and security.  As a result, we have seen a defensive, but non-military alliance - something totally different from what we have learned about NATO in the past.

What are possible tasks for the EU's military (rapid reaction) forces?  We still don't know.  Obviously, they will not be able to receive the UN mandate for peace-keeping operations in the former Soviet Union without Russia's support.  For Russia, which aims to achieve a status quo in world politics, the reconstruction of the UN and UN Security Council's role is today the top strategic priority.  It is likely that European countries are also concerned in keeping the UN as the basic international forum for discussing problems of international security and defining the 'rules of the game' in world politics.  In theory, joint peace-keeping and crisis-managing operations by Russia and EU may be a solution.  But at the moment there is no such spot on the map where the EU may use its new military forces.  All conflicts in the former USSR are now 'low-intensity conflicts', but there is the quite clear possibility of their resumption, especially between Abhazia and Georgia, in Nagornyy Karabakh and in Tajikistan.  Probably, there is only one exception - conflict between Moldova and Transnistria.  But due to recent political developments in the country (the return of Communists to power and beginning of full-scale political dialogue between Chisinau and Tiraspol), the EU's intervention into the conflict seems very unreal and out-of-date.  Neither Transnistria nor Moscow will welcome it, and Chisinau probably shares this attitude.

According to the prevailing opinion of Russian political elite, NATO is initiating a growth in the role of the use of force in contemporary international relations, trying to change the existing system of international security in the interests of a small group of states.  'Routine' bombardments of Iraq, which became a reality under the new Administration in the USA, are one of the most dangerous threats to stability on the planet, and this threat is coming from the only superpower in the world.  Reacting to this transformation, Russia has changed in the year 2000 all major documents (Concepts and Doctrines) which regulate Russia's position in world politics and define Russia's perception of threats to national security.  As Sergey Ivanov stated in an interview: 'The priorities of threats to national security of Russia did not change.  But what did change is the scale and level of [Russia's] national life's work.'

The role of the USA in European politics in the new century is continuing to be unclear for Russia. The USA continues to be the leader of NATO. In practice this role extends to it becoming *de facto* the largest European country. As a result, the European nations can not be totally independent in decision-making in some of the most important spheres of politics and security. The history of the previous five decades demonstrates that the alliance of Western Europe and USA is very stable and firm. It was able even to pass the test of the disintegration of the USSR and collapse of the Warsaw Pact. However, with lowering of the share of military problems within the general complex of problems of European politics, the USA mission in Europe is changing. The need to establish different regimes for international trade, investment, protection of the environment is now beginning to replace the fixed mutual obligations of military allies. New regimes are not centred on firm and fixed obligations, and their effectiveness will be tested by dozens of large and small problems, which sovereign countries face regularly on the international arena. It is too early and too difficult to predict if there will be a 'common interest' of Europe and USA in the solution of trade disputes, conflicts related to the agrarian sector of economy, etc. We think that the near future will demonstrate whether the USA is willing to continue to be a 'European country', or whether Washington is reorienting its foreign policy towards more economically attractive and politically dangerous regions, such as the Pacific Rim or South Asia. The question which was formulated 10 years ago continues to be important: can NATO exist in a situation in which it lacks a powerful rival to shape the attitudes of its political elites and its public opinions? There is no such rival yet, and all attempts by the Baltic states to present Russia in this role fortunately failed.

Surprisingly enough, Russian generals are among the most active proponents of European defence initiatives. As the first deputy Head of the General Staff Colonel-General Valery Manilov said in an interview: 'We consider the idea as very promising and important for providing security in Europe. Even more, we think that realization of this type of ideas should become the basis for a stable world in the XXI century. We are taking into account that Europe can not reject trans-Atlantic links and should build its own security system according to these links. But from the other side, Europeans have to keep in mind Russian-Asian aspect of security problems.'

The inevitability and historical determination of EU enlargement needs analysis in details, and the thesis about the unity of Europe which was popular in early 1990s is not so resonant within Europe today. Enlargement is a very costly process and so EU citizens would like to know what exactly the benefits will be at the final stage of the eastward enlargement. Obviously, the EU enlargement is inevitable and profitable for all participating countries in the long run. It may take a long period of time, or it may start soon, but in forms that differ from original expectations of Central and Eastern European countries. Russia's position can be characterised as the following: it is too early to speak about continent-wide co-operation and partnership. Generally speaking, Russia does not believe in 'co-operation' with the West, after learning many hard lessons of relations with the West in the 1990s. The most probable and economically rational variant of enlargement is the following: it will take about 8 years even for leading nations in Central and Eastern Europe and lead to formation of a sort of "division of labour" between (1) Western Europe, (2) Central and Eastern Europe (including three Baltic states), and (3) former USSR countries. The ideal plan for Western Europe is the following: the creation of transport infrastructure, that allows Europe to compete with other major centres of economic power in the world via access to natural resources of former USSR republics (Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan), treatment of their resources in Central

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and Eastern European countries by western companies, and production of high-tech goods in Western Europe. In this manner the European Union will be able to solve the problems which appeared during the Nice 2000 European Council in very sharp form. It is already impossible to stop the process of enlargement, but it is politically very damaging to endow new members with the same rights enjoyed by current members of the EU.

In these conditions, the Eastern European countries have an objective interest in the implementation of enlargement. New democratic nations will receive huge investments in heavy industry in the initial stage, and at some time - full membership in the EU. For the Russian Federation the prospect (supply of natural resources to Central and Eastern Europe) is not very attractive, but, most probably, there will be no choice for Moscow. The capacity of Russia's internal market is still very limited, and modest internal demand for goods does not attract much needed investments for the development of a wide range of modern branches of industry.

## Conclusions

The main and the most important 'weapons' that the European Union has in the field of conflict resolution are financial-economic resources and the ability to provide economic assistance. Probably, the EU will try 'to buy' peace in some parts on the periphery of Europe. The role of the new European army will be to observe that all conflicting sides will respect the conditions of the 'purchase'. Currently, Russia is not able financially to follow the same policy in the CIS territory. It is important to strengthen the continuing suspicion of the CIS leaders to any new Russian initiative in the security sphere. There is 'nuclear integration' under formation now on the post-Soviet space, which includes Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kirgiziya, Tajikistan and Armenia), and a readiness to reconstruct military co-operation with Russia. It is quite difficult to predict how far these military contacts go. In practice, Russia is ready to guarantee the territorial integrity of these states, but at the moment a more real option is to give such guarantees on a bilateral basis. The then secretary of the Security Council Sergey Ivanov in January 2001 expressed Russian policy well: Russia will give a special priority to bilateral links and does not evaluate as profitable integration processes within CIS frameworks. We think that participation of the EU states in conflict resolution in the CIS appears hardly possible in the near future. There is only one serious sphere of interconnection of Russia and EU: crisis management in the Balkans. But in a situation in which Russia is losing influence in the Balkans, these contacts and co-operation are more profitable for the EU, and less so for Russia. Objectively speaking, Russia should react to military co-operation within the European Union negatively. At least until now, Russia has constituted an equal partner with the EU in establishing international security institutions on the continent and participating in their functioning. We think that Russia's official position will quite soon become more negative towards the creation by the EU of its own military forces. But currently, the possibilities of the EU to act effectively in crisis management on the European continent are not clear. Russia is pausing before reacting. Only in a situation when Russia's voice is taken into account in shaping EU crisis management policy will Russia's position be more favourable towards the European Union, and their contacts constructive.

# The Future of European Crisis Management
# - A Critical Perspective

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One could argue that the future of European crisis management looks promising indeed. The EU's crisis management capacity is becoming a reality, and this is a dream come true for many. Not only so, but there is also something else to congratulate oneself for: the pace of this development has been amazing, the troops have been committed without problems or delays, and the target year of 2003 is almost there.

Listening to some people entrusted with the task of refining the EU's military arsenal and planning for joint operations one could even get the impression that they now only look for a crisis, hoping for a suitable crisis to take place - one that is not too big and messy, but not too little and insignificant, either - in order to be able to test this new machinery, and, through a test successfully passed, to claim still another victory for the EU and the integration process as a whole. It is almost as though the EU needed a crisis more than the victims of a crisis need its crisis management.

Yet we can also sense some caution, or a fear of failure. Once the EU announces that its crisis management capability is operative, in 2003, it is expected to act in a crisis. In a way, it is expected to act already now, but expectations grow. Once it is declared to be operative, however, it cannot fail, since that would mean a blow for its credibility. In a sense, thus, a crisis to be managed once the EU does have crisis management capabilities can be more of a crisis for the EU itself. What if the new institutions do not function? What if the capabilities are not enough? What if the division of labour between the EU and NATO does not work? At worst, the EU would be worse off than before the hype about its crisis management capabilities. What will the EU then do? Will it perhaps take the easy way out and give the responsibility for managing the crisis to someone else? After all, it could do that; it has not, as of yet, defined what crises it actually aims at tackling, or what its responsibilities are.

What brought us to this point? We know that the pace of the changes has been fast. But why so fast? The rapidity has been caused by several factors. First, embarking on crisis management was to do what any sensible person would do, to borrow a Finnish saying, to climb over a fence at its lowest point - yet, we also know that the fence is here high enough to impede turning back: we know the inability of the EU to go backwards once it has taken steps forward in a given realm. Second, there were some unintended consequences of actions taken by different players that inadvertently contributed to this process.

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Let us look at these factors a bit more closely.

Climbing over the fence at its lowest point, I said. Creating crisis management capabilities in the end was not difficult: it was very easy. We were used to thinking that integration in foreign policy was difficult, and that anything having to do with the military and defence would be totally unthinkable. The last years have been years of surprising development in this field where not much was expected, and which according to established theories was in any case to remain outside the sphere of integration - actually, it was a proof of theories like the realist ones that there was a limit to integration.

Still, crisis management is easy: it is easier than common defence, and it is easier than enlarging the Union, or agreeing to a common constitution, or reforming the CAP.

Another theoretical bias or view where we may also get caught is that crisis management would be developed as crisis management, that the need to manage crises would be the main if not the only reason for the measures taken. Again, things seem very different. Crisis management developed for a variety of other motivations as well: as a way of bringing forward integration, or avoiding deadlocks; and as a way that allows for participation and influence for some particular countries. In the first sense, it has been a motor for integration - thus performing a similar function to the EMU or enlargement - and in the second sense, it has permitted the UK, and perhaps also the USA, to have a foot inside the EU and even a leading position. So, crisis management is not only about responses to crises. The decision to embark on crisis management can even be a 'substitute activity' in a Union that needs to show progress and dynamism but is facing difficulties in other realms, such as enlargement.

Crisis management is well-suited for these two purposes - enhancing the EU's international role and giving a foothold for particular interests or countries - in that it yields results, visibility; it is about efficiency and concrete power. After all, it has ramifications in armaments industry, linking, thus, big business interests into the development. In comparison, civilian crisis management and conflict prevention do not possess these competitive edges. They can in practice be almost any activities - ranging from promoting student exchange to improving living standards or encouraging free media. This is particularly true for conflict prevention where one could argue that the EU already has been engaged. In this sense, there is not the same sense of novelty as in military crisis management - no-one gets thrilled by the feeling of starting something new. Furthermore, civilian crisis management and conflict prevention, as they do not similarly attract the defence industry, lack the additional background driving force that these industrial interests can be in the development of European military crisis management capabilities.

In a second sense, too, crisis management has involved climbing over the fence at its lowest point. The good old 'functional logic of integration' tells us to start from easy things, and have faith in subsequent spill-over. In this particular case, the 'functional' method of establishing a crisis management capacity for the EU has been to start with institutions and capabilities. Why? They are easy, much more easy than to tackle first the questions of who we are, what we want, or who are we responsible for and what means do we approve of. These remain without answers; there is no underlying political consensus on what is to be done, on intervention strategies, on the 'upper

limits' or geographical extension of joint operations, and the like.  What one *can* agree on, then, are new institutions and the numbers of troops (which is somewhat bizarre as one could think that it is impossible to know how many troops are needed without knowing what they are going to do).

Two more features of this integration logic can be added: the difficulty in taking steps 'backwards' or renouncing a step, and the fact that security provides a powerful legitimising device for integrative measures, in this case crisis management.  Crisis management is a concrete manifestation of the EU's security political role.  Security is a rationale behind integration, and once one starts from assumptions like 'common security is good' and 'integration enhances security', it is also easy to justify the concrete measures taken in crisis management in that they contribute to security.  Let us, for instance, restrict the access to documents about crisis management - a first priority, after all, is to protect the security of the common operations …  It may be difficult to approach these apparently self-evident claims in a more nuanced way, being critical where needed.

I also mentioned the unintended consequences of some actions that have carried the development further.  One perfectly understands that there are countries that bring crisis management (and common defence) forward because they have always fancied it, or because they want to gain influence in it and through it in the EU.  But even countries that are not members or that a priori have a different view about the EU's nature and have perhaps pronounced against its defence dimension at some point may actually be bringing forward this development.

Let me take two examples of paradoxical effects of some countries' position on their policies and thus on the development of crisis management.

First, there are the countries that want to become members of the Union and that need to show loyalty and Europeanness.  How to do that?  Trying to fulfil the membership criteria, but this is a tricky path, as the criteria seem to be growing.  One could also take advantage of other ways, such as: conforming to policies of the Union even before membership (voting like the members), and committing troops! For the not-yet-members, such concrete contributions are an opportunity to show Europeanness, which is strange as such - it is almost as if one bought membership with arms.  There are echos of what is almost like a competition between the candidates about who is the most generous per capita.  No wonder then the number of European troops easily grows.

Second, there are the non-aligned EU member countries.  Their paradox lies in the fact that they can become eager supporters of all development in order to compensate or to minimise the doubts about them being unreliable.  Their joining the EU was one factor behind the need to launch the then ambitious CFSP: one wanted to ensure that their policies would be bound by the jointly agreed principles.  Themselves, they later on advocated including the Petersberg tasks in the Amsterdam Treaty.  While Sweden has been generous in terms of troops for crisis management, committing even Jas fighters, Finland was ready for enhanced cooperation in defence and armaments industry within the EU.  These countries' willingness to be good Europeans almost makes it seem that they do not have views of their own - one might ask, for instance, what is

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the relevance of Finland's position that peacekeeping operations are to have a mandate by the UN or the OSCE today.

In conclusion, there has been great hurry in this field, as to seize an opportunity provided by the sudden convergence of several actors' ideas, trying to be fast. The consequences, then, of this need to hurry and get something done is that one tends to take on easily found ready models and to start with the easy questions.

Thus, we arrive at a problematic situation where we suddenly have new institutions and military forces. Once they are there, they will probably have to find something to do. Are we then to be worried about growing militarism, the EU resort to "yesterday's tools and answers" - military power - to today's problems? Not necessarily. There is always another side to these issues, too: including the military and defence forces in EU integration is a step away from the traditional system of state power and state sovereignty, towards new and more modern, perhaps more meaningful, uses of the military. Similarly in EU-NATO relations, we might see not only an introduction of military practices or culture in the EU, but also a possibility for the EU to influence NATO.

In all, there is hardly reason for alarmism. Yet, it would be good to keep in mind two points. First, that the EU should perhaps not aim at doing everything itself: there are other actors as well, and a division of labour perhaps increases efficiency. Secondly, the EU has other projects as well, not only crisis management. It is tempting to tackle the easy things first, but one should not for that reason leave the difficult ones aside - like enlargement. Enlargement, after all, is but a very efficient form of foreign policy, of crisis management and crisis prevention.